The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality by Weiser, Philip J.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality 
Philip J. Weiser 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons, Consumer 
Protection Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons 
Citation Information 
Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273 (2008), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/457. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 60 Admin. L. Rev.  273 2008 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Mar 21 14:42:58 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
ARTICLES





I. Untangling the Strands of the Policy Debate .................................. 276
A. The Legacy of Best Efforts Connections and the Evolving
Intern et ..................................................................................... 27 7
B . The Internet A s It Is ................................................................. 279
C. The Lim its of Laissez-Faire ..................................................... 284
D. Raising the Level of the Debate .............................................. 288
II. A Consumer Protection Strategy for Broadband Regulation .......... 290
A. The Role of the FTC in Requiring Disclosure of
Broadband Service Offerings .................................................. 291
B. The Role of Effective Disclosure, Self-Regulation, and
FTC Enforcem ent .................................................................... 298
III. Toward a New Competition Policy Strategy .................................. 301
A . The Past A s Prologue? ............................................................. 302
B. The Terminating Access Monopoly and the Bilateral
M onopoly Problem .................................................................. 307
C. Categorical Rules Versus Legal Standards .............................. 310
1. The Call of the Categorical Rule ....................................... 311
2. The Possible Precision of a Legal Standard ....................... 313
a. The Possible Legitimate Justifications for Exclusive
A rrangem ents ............................................................... 313
* Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado; Executive
Director, Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program. This Article benefited from
helpful conversations with and feedback from Rob Atkinson, Ray Gifford, Dale Hatfield,
Scott Hemphill, Adam Peters, and Jill Van Matre, as well as first-rate research assistance by
Kaleb Sieh.
ADM1NISTRA TIVE LA W REVIEW
b. The Presence of Effective Enforcement Mechanisms ..... 318
c. The Value of Continuing Best Efforts Internet Access ...320
C onclu sion ................................................................................................. 322
INTRODUCTION
Broadband Internet access is the sine qua non of the information age.
Indeed, recent surveys suggest that broadband is the communications
service that consumers can "least live without."' In less than a decade,
broadband Internet technology has already transformed the music industry
(Napster and iTunes), is in the midst of revolutionizing the delivery of
voice communications (Vonage and Skype), and is beginning to change the
video programming industry (YouTube). It is not surprising, therefore, that
the regulation of broadband has generated heated policy debates.
What is surprising about broadband policy is that the debate quickly
moved to the halls of Congress, thereby politicizing the issue,
overshadowing the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC)
policymaking role, and crowding out any room for reasonable debate and
discussion.2 With the likelihood of congressional action now dimmed, the
FCC has moved to evaluate-by issuing a Notice of Inquiry and
investigating Comcast's network management practices-the concern that
owners of broadband networks are using, or will use, their control over
those networks to undermine competition for Internet-enabled services and
content.3 Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has weighed in
on the issue, holding a set of hearings on the state of broadband
competition and issuing a report that sets forth its blueprint for competition
and consumer protection policy analysis.4 Consequently, as the rhetorical
temperature cools down in Washington, D.C., there is a new opportunity
for reasoned analysis of how policymakers should, or should not, regulate
broadband networks.
The challenge for policymakers is to bring reasoned analysis to bear on a
topic that continues to generate more heat than light in policy circles and
1. See North American Homes Rate Broadband As Key Wireline Service, IQ ONLINE,
Oct. 27, 2006, http://www.arm.com/iqonline/news/marketnews/1 5168.html.
2. As one observer put it, "The subject of Net Neutrality has become so politicized
that it's almost impossible to have a rational debate on the subject." Posting of George Ou
to RealWorldIT, A Rational Debate on Net Neutrality, ZDNET, http://blogs.zdnet.com/
Ou/?p=512 (June 4, 2007, 5:40 EST) [hereinafter Ou, A Rational Debate].
3. Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894 (2007), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-07-31Al.pdf; Public Notice, Comments
Sought on Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Internet Management Policies, WC Docket
No. 07-52 (Jan. 14, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-
08-92Al.pdf. For the full text of the report, see FED. TRADE COMM'N, BROADBAND
CONNECTIVITY COMPETITON POLICY (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/
v070000report.pdf [hereinafter BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY].
4. See BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, supra note 3.
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that many telecommunications companies appear to believe will fade away.
During the fall of 2007, the revelation that Comcast had interfered with
BitTorrent (a peer-to-peer application) and engaged in an undisclosed form
of network management that interfered with its customers' experience dealt
a blow to broadband providers who hoped their networks could escape any
form of regulatory oversight. Similarly, a decision by Verizon to initially
exclude NARAL, a pro-choice group, from using Verizon's text messaging
service to reach its members raised concerns among consumer groups who
called for both greater transparency as to the relevant terms of service and
regulatory oversight of currently unregulated services. A New York Times
editorial, for example, condemned Verizon's conduct (even though Verizon
quickly changed its position), saying that "[f]reedom of speech must be
guaranteed, right now, in a digital world just as it has been protected in a
world of paper and ink."6 Although neither the Comcast nor the Verizon
episode has yet to spur the adoption of new regulations, both controversies
provided ammunition for the argument that broadband service providers
should not be allowed to operate free from any regulatory oversight.7
In an effort to reframe the policy and academic debates over broadband
regulation, this Article sets forth a blueprint for a "next generation
regulatory strategy."8 In particular, it seeks to escape the pitfalls of the
5. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discussing how the BitTorrent incident
highlighted the need for more transparency in network management so that restrictions are
reasonable and consumers are able to make informed choices regarding providers).
6. Editorial, The Verizon Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A24. Following the
uproar in this case, a group of public interest groups called for a greater level of regulatory
oversight of instant messaging-notably, the imposition of a common carrier obligation to
treat all communications on a nondiscriminatory basis. See Public Knowledge et al.,
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING STATING THAT TEXT MESSAGING AND SHORT CODES
ARE TITLE II SERVICES OR ARE TITLE I SERVICES SUBJECT TO SECTION 202 NONDISCRIMINATION
RULES, at ii (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/text-message-
petition-20071211 .pdf (arguing that "[d]iscrimination in providing mobile services" stifles
speech, competition, and innovation in contravention of Title I and Title II of the
Communications Act).
7. Recognizing this point, one reporter observed that an FCC hearing into the
Comcast-BitTorrent matter and the introduction of a bill by Representative Markey "signals
a clear revival of a temporarily dormant debate over whether Net neutrality laws are
needed." Anne Broache, Comcast vs. BitTorrent to be Focus of FCC Hearing, CNET
NEWS.COM, Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.news.com/Comcast-vs.-BitTorrent-to-be-focus-of-
FCC-hearing/2100-1028_3-6231737.html.
8. In so doing, it builds upon my previous work in the area. See Broadband
Competition Hearings Before the Fed. Trade Comm 'n (2007) (testimony of Philip J. Weiser,
Prof. of Law and Telecommunications and Executive Director of the Silicon Flatirons
Program, University of Colorado), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/
broadband/presentations/weiser.pdf; Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A Third Way
on Network Neutrality, NEW ATLANTIS, Summer 2006, at 47, available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/13/TNA13-AtkinsonWeiser.pdf, Philip J. Weiser,
Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41 (2003) [hereinafter
Weiser, Toward a Next Generation]; see also JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP
J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET
AGE (MIT Press 2005); Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration
2008]
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ongoing debate over broadband regulation (centered on calls for and
against "network neutrality" regulation), which has failed to focus on the
critical issues and has remained mired in rhetorical claims. Indeed,
reflecting his concern that even the academic discourse has often featured
categorical claims about the optimal regulatory strategy,9 Internet pioneer
David Clark remarked that "[m]ost of what we have seen so far (in my
opinion) either greatly overreaches, or is so vague as to be nothing but a
lawyer's employment act."10
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines the policy debate to
date, explaining how it has presented polarized perspectives on the network
neutrality issue. In so doing, Part I cautions against congressional action
and recommends that the FCC and the FTC be afforded an opportunity to
develop an effective consumer protection and competition policy strategy.
Part II discusses my proposed consumer protection strategy, suggesting that
the FTC oversee a system of effective disclosure and enforcement of
broadband provider terms of use policies. Part III sets forth a competition
policy strategy, arguing that either the FTC or the FCC (or both) will need
to develop an effective institutional strategy to guard against anticompetitive
refusals to provide access to quality of service (QoS) assurances.
I. UNTANGLING THE STRANDS OF THE POLICY DEBATE
One casualty of the network neutrality debate on Capitol Hill is that the
issue became more politicized and polarized than traditional technology
policy debates, which often stay below the radar and are initially discussed
and considered by a more select group of policymakers. As the Center for
Democracy and Technology put it, the debate "has often been dominated
by slogans, extreme rhetoric, and arguments that focus on attacking straw
men rather than grappling with the real complexity of the issue."11 That
and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the
Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003).
9. For a sense of the academic debate, see Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Debate, Keeping
the Internet Neutral?, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (debating the network neutrality issue and
offering up their suggested solutions). Compare Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating
Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End
Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004) (offering an economic critique of
proposals to mandate that broadband providers adhere to certain principles of network
neutrality), with Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User's Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 69 (2004) (concluding that the solution to the network neutrality issue lies with
establishing rules that pre-commit both industry and government to open market entry).
10. David D. Clark, Network Neutrality: Words of Power and 800-Pound Gorillas,
I INT'L J. COMM. 701, 708 (2007), available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/
viewPDFInterstitial/158/83/.
11. Broadband Industry Practices, Comments of the Center for Democracy & Technology
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this otherwise arcane telecommunications policy issue broke through into
popular consciousness is to be cheered; after all, the public should care
about telecommunications policy. Unfortunately, the debate was cast in
relatively absolute terms and stripped of its nuance, thereby creating a set
of false choices-either for a complete laissez-faire approach or a very
restrictive prophylactic regulatory regime.1
2
One reason for the polarization of the debate on Capitol Hill is that the
call for "network neutrality" represents two very distinct phenomena: a
commitment to an egalitarian Internet and a concern about the specter of
anticompetitive conduct as to Internet-enabled services and content. At
least in the congressional arena, the vision that everyone on the Internet
should be equal sometimes eclipsed the latter concern, which is animated
by economic analysis and requires a more empirically grounded analysis.
Similarly, those opposed to network neutrality regulation often indulged in
a different form of ideological invective-that the regulation of the Internet
would constitute a departure from its laissez-faire roots and jeopardize its
evolution. To analyze the state of the network neutrality debate, Section A
dissects the rhetoric offered in favor of network neutrality and Section B
evaluates the rhetoric invoked against it. Building on this analysis,
Section C suggests that the debate is best addressed by the FCC and the
FTC. In particular, both institutions are better positioned than Congress to
reject the categorical calls for and against regulation, and to recognize that
the concerns that animate this debate are best confronted with a scalpel, not
a sledgehammer.
A. The Legacy of Best Efforts Connections and the Evolving Internet
The Internet developed initially as an academic curiosity, based on a
commitment to the "end-to-end principle." This principle requires that all
Internet traffic, whether an email, a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
"call," or a video stream, be treated equally and managed through "best
efforts" connections.' 3 In such a network, data packets pass from one
router to another without the prioritization of any particular packets. In
practice, this means that Internet traffic reaches its destination at varying
times, depending on the traffic levels of the relevant Internet
12. For a general critique of this phenomenon, see E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS
HATE POLITICS (Simon & Schuster 1991). For a specific critical evaluation of the
congressional debate on net neutrality, see Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 8, at 49.
13. For the classic discussion of the end-to-end principle, see J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed
& D.D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMP.
Sys. 277 (1984), available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/
endtoend.pdf (expounding the end-to-end principle).
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communications links. For those who have found emails arriving hours
after they were sent, the concept of unpredictable traffic patterns in Internet
networks should sound familiar.
Based on the vision that best efforts Internet access is the only kind of
access consistent with the Internet's traditional open architecture, Senator
Ron Wyden proposed a ban on any varying levels (or tiers) of service
offered to Internet content or service providers. Notably, this proposal
treats as irrelevant whether a particular offering requires some form of a
QoS guarantee to be effective. As Senator Wyden explained when
introducing his bill, any such evaluation is inappropriate because
"'[c]reating a two-tiered system could have a chilling effect on small mom
and pop businesses that can't afford the priority lane, leaving these smaller
businesses no hope of competing against the Wal-Marts of the world.
' '"1 4
Reflecting this perspective, the network neutrality debate is often described
as the dispute between those who are for allowing the tiering of broadband
Internet services (anti-network neutrality) and those who are against it
(pro-network neutrality). 5
Given the political nature of congressional debate, many interested
parties adopted shorthand descriptions and sound bites to explain their
positions on network neutrality. In an appropriate move for an Internet-
related issue, some of these sound bites were memorably captured in videos
posted on YouTube.16  Whether by necessity or design, major Internet
companies found themselves aligned with the egalitarian ethos of the
Wyden bill, even where their own business models called for a level of
complexity ignored in the mainstream policy debate. Nonetheless, in their
attempt to frame the network neutrality debate with a slogan, major Internet
companies adopted the shorthand that the goal of network neutrality
regulation was to protect an Internet that could facilitate "'innovation
without permission."' 
1 7
14. Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Moves To Ensure Fairness of Internet
Usage With New Net Neutrality Bill (Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://wyden.senate.gov/
newsroom/record.cfm?id=266467 (quoting Sen. Ron Wyden).
15. See Robert Hahn & Scott Wallsten, The Economics of Net Neutrality, THE
ECONOMISTS' VOICE (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/
authorpdfs/page.php?id = 1269 ("Net neutrality has no widely accepted precise definition, but
usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet
access, don't favor one content provider over another, and don't charge content providers
for sending information over broadband lines to end users.").
16. Compare Ask a Ninja Special Delivery 4 "Net Neutrality", YouTUBE (May 11,
2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H69eCYcDcuQ (explaining the importance of
network neutrality to prevent content discrimination), with Hands Off the Internet,
YoUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlhSbJYxOnc (arguing that
fair competition in the market will bring maximum choice in suppliers, content, and
technology to the consumer without unnecessary government regulation).
17. Letter from Jeff Bezos et al. to Senators Ted Stevens & Daniel Inouye (Apr. 25,
2006), http://netcompetition.org/docs/pronetneut/leaders-042506.pdf. Timothy Bemers-Lee,
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Protecting would-be Internet innovators is, by all accounts, a crucial
competition policy concern. This objective, however, does not necessarily
require adherence to an equality norm enforced by an Internet architecture
solely defined by best efforts connections. After all, one can imagine the
development of QoS offerings that are provided in such a manner as to
allow new services to emerge in a competitively fair fashion. Reflecting
this view, Andrew McLaughlin, Google's Senior Policy Counsel, explained
that "[i]t is much better" to think of network neutrality "as an FTC or unfair
competition type of problem."'18  Indeed, in explaining this position,
McLaughlin expressly condoned offering QoS assurances as long as they
were available to all interested providers.1 9 McLaughlin's explanation,
however, was later downplayed by Google (whose spokesperson called the
statement McLaughlin's "personal view") in the wake of criticism that
Google had abandoned the cause of network neutrality.2°
B. The Internet As It Is
To move the network neutrality debate forward, it is critical to separate it
from the aspirations of what the Internet should be and to ground it in what
the Internet already is. Stated simply, the Internet is not, and will never
again be, a purely best-efforts-based network.21 Indeed, given the ability to
the creator of the World Wide Web, echoed these remarks, explaining that "[a]nyone can
build a new application on the Web, without asking me, or Vint Cerf [co-creator of the
Internet Protocol], or their ISP, or their cable company, or their operating system provider,
or their government, or their hardware vendor." Posting of Tim Bemers-Lee to Timbl's
Blog, Neutrality of the Net, May 2, 2006, http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/node/132/
(May 2, 2006, 15:22 EST); see also Comments of the CDT, supra note 11, at 1 ("CDT
strongly believes that the Internet's extraordinary success in facilitating independent
innovation and speech is directly linked to the fact that any Internet user can provide content
and services to any other willing Internet user, without getting permission from any
'gatekeeper."').
18. Posting of Drew Clark to GigaOM, Is Google Changing Its Position on Net
Neutrality?, GIGAOM, Mar. 13, 2007, http://gigaom.com/2007/03/13/is-google-changing-
its-position-on-net-neutrality/.
19. As Clark detailed:
Peter Pitsch, Intel's director of communications policy, asked [McLaughlin]: "I
inferred from what you said about [net neutrality] that you would not object to
[carriers] making a particular offering, as long as that offering were made available
on a non-discriminatory basis?"
"That is my view," replied McLaughlin. He described a "strong" view of
neutrality in which carriers are forbidden from charging companies for quality-of-
service (QoS) guarantees "because that breaks the free and open model" of the
Internet. "There is a more pragmatic view that it is OK [to charge] as long as it is
done in a non-discriminatory way."
Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original).
20. Id.
21. A number of leading Internet technologists have elaborated on this point. See, e.g.,
David D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-to-End Argument and Application




deliver real-time services over the Internet-ranging from video
conferencing to live video programming-it is important that the Internet
evolve so that users can be guaranteed QoS assurances. After all, for
commercial firms using the Internet to deliver valued communications
services or offer premium content or services, the ability to ensure QoS is
essential to their effective use of the Internet. Recognizing this point, the
Internet Engineering Task Force-the standard-setting body charged with
developing the basic Internet standards-has long evaluated new
technologies to provide enhanced QoS.
22
As a practical matter, one can think about the relevant communications
links that support Internet traffic in two categories: local access networks
and Internet backbone networks. Because of the Internet's "network of
networks" architecture, Internet communications can be handed off to a
number of providers along the way to their end destinations, meaning that
delay can ensue based on congestion at any number of points. In the case
of email, for example, delays may not trouble many users because they are
not engaged in any mission-critical or real-time communications. But for
other applications, such as video conferencing or voice communications,
delays can be annoying at best; at worst, they can defeat the utility of the
application.
nal%20TPRC.pdf ("Applications and services on the Internet today do not just reside at the
'end points'; they have become more complex, with intermediate servers and services
provided by third parties interposed between the communicating end-points."); Jon M. Peha,
The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced
Policy, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 644, 659 (2007), available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/
article/view/154/90 (noting a shift away from end-to-end for "sound technical reasons,"
such as the ability to provide enhanced security and faster access to stored content).
22. As one Internet Engineering Task Force report states:
The essence of real-time service is the requirement for some service guarantees,
and we argue that guarantees cannot be achieved without reservations.... [T]he
user must be able to get a service whose quality is sufficiently predicable that the
application can operate in an acceptable way over a duration of time determined by
the user.
Robert Braden, David Clark & Scott Shenker, Memorandum in Response to Request for
Comments, Integrated Services in the Internet Architecture: An Overview, at 3 (1994),
available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl633.txt; see also F. Le Faucheur & W. Lai, Memorandum
in Response to Request for Comments, Requirements for Support of Differentiated Services-
Aware MPLS Traffic Engineering, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3564.txt
("To achieve fine-grained optimization of transmission resources and further enhanced
network performance and efficiency.., it may be desirable to perform traffic engineering at
a per-class level instead of at an aggregate level."). Another article discusses the
differentiated services strategy, stating:
[l]t is a simple way of marking every packet for an appropriate service class, so that
VolP traffic can be handled with less jitter than Web browsing, for example.
Obviously, this is desirable from a user viewpoint, and it's ironic that the more
extreme legislative proposals for so-called "net neutrality" would ostensibly outlaw
it, as well as outlawing priority handling for VoIP calls to 911.
Brian Carpenter, Better, Faster, More Secure, ACM QUEUE, Dec. 2006-Jan. 2007, at 42, 46,
available at http://portal.acm.org/ft-gateway.cfmn?id=l 189290&type=pdf.
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For enterprise consumers, using best efforts connections for business-
critical applications (say, delivery of time-sensitive documents via email
instead of by fax machine) is not an option. Thus, to ensure that enterprises
enjoy guaranteed QoS connections, chief information officers regularly
contract for "service level agreements" (SLAs) directly with Internet
backbone providers (such as Sprint). SLAs vary, but a typical agreement
provides limited assurances against network congestion and for timely
delivery of relevant information.23 Firms with major content hosted on
websites (like ESPN.com) limit the opportunities for congestion by
contracting with both Internet backbone providers and "content delivery
networks" (like Akamai) that have built servers across the country to store
(or "cache") content locally, which limits the likelihood of congestion
along the way. In short, the Internet already affords firms with the
opportunity to ensure the prioritization of traffic for a fee.24
Even amidst the development of SLAs by backbone providers and local
content caching services, local access networks remain a potential
bottleneck for Internet communications. Depending on the behavior of
local users, congestion can greatly slow or otherwise compromise Internet
access.25 Because Internet networks have not adopted QoS management
techniques, the general rule of thumb for current Internet users is that time-
sensitive applications like VoIP and video programming delivery are often
not delivered at the same QoS levels provided by traditional
communications platforms (e.g., wireline telephone networks and cable
television systems). But over time, and assuming that regulations do not
prevent it, broadband networks are likely to adopt technologies that can
support QoS levels that rival traditional networks for certain applications
while leaving the best efforts network to support other applications.26
23. See Jon Crowcroft, Net Neutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate, 1 INT'L J. OF
COMM. 567, 572 (2007), available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/
159/84 ("Many ISPs offer statistical guarantees of performance (above and beyond a simple
bland statement of 'Best Effort') .... [such as] zero packet loss .... ").
24. See Ou, A Rational Debate, supra note 2 ("[T]here have long been contractual
agreements QoS ... packet prioritization for business customers. These agreements allow
customers to pay a premium to permit a certain percentage of traffic (usually a small
percent) to get traffic prioritization across a carrier's network.").
25. Notably, the speed at which a web page downloads or a Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) application operates is not merely the function of the available bandwidth.
In particular, even with a high level of bandwidth, "latency"--delay in the delivery of
information--or the presence of "jitter"-variability in a communications link-can
undermine the delivery of real-time communications. If there is only latency in a network,
there are strategies to manage that issue (at least up to a point), but the presence of both
latency and jitter is very difficult to manage for purposes of enabling real-time applications.
26. See Andrew Orlowski, Father of Internet Warns Against Net Neutrality, REGISTER, Jan.
18, 2007, http://www.theregister.com/2007/01/18/kahn-net-neutrality.waming (discouraging
reporting on Robert Kahn's caution against legislation that restricts innovation and
experimentation in network technologies).
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For the Internet to develop effectively, it is important for policymakers
to appreciate that QoS assurances are not an unfortunate development, but
a necessary one that may well be good for customers.27  Thus, it is a
considerable overstatement to assert-as the New York Times did in an
editorial-that such assurances endanger the democratic character of the
Internet.28 Rather, as the Washington Post countered, it is more accurate to
describe the Internet as a democratic medium, albeit one where major
players have advantages over smaller upstarts.29 In particular, as the
Washington Post explained, major companies already use "caching"
services (using technology sold by Akamai and other firms) to ensure more
effective and expeditious delivery of their content than the start-up
companies do by using a single server to provide content all around the
world.30
Part of the resistance to QoS assurances is the concern that broadband
providers will charge some consumers more than others. Price discrimination,
as this practice is commonly known among economists, is not clearly
harmful to consumers because it provides firms with a relatively efficient
vehicle for recovering their investment in expensive infrastructure (at least
in some cases). 31 Airlines, for example, use price discrimination strategies
by offering discounts for a "Saturday night stay-over." If they were
prohibited from offering lower fares for individuals staying over on a
Saturday night or charging higher fares to someone booking a trip at the
last minute, by contrast, the result would be that many consumers who
benefit from selective discounts would pay higher fares than they currently
do or not fly at all.
27. A variety of technologies can assure higher levels of quality of service (QoS). See
Peha, supra note 21, at 649, 653-54 (discussing QoS technologies). Some technologists
fear that these technologies will be implemented in an anticompetitive manner. However,
that fear does not mean that the technologies are incapable of providing valuable consumer
benefits, rather that they can also facilitate anticompetitive discrimination. See John
G. Waclawsky, IMS 101: What You Need to Know Now, Bus. COMM. REV. June 2005, at 18,
23 (describing the use of Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem as a double-edged sword
insofar as it institutes "a control layer and a cash register over the Internet and [allows
carriers to] creatively charge" for access to its functionalities).
28. Editorial, Keeping a Democratic Web, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A24, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/02/opinion/02tue3.html.
29. Editorial, The Eden Illusion, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2006, at A14, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/12/AR2006031200808.html.
30. Id. As one report explained, content and applications providers might be "willing to
pay Akamai [and other content delivery networks] a premium to deliver their content faster
and more reliably" to end users. Scott Woolley, Video Prophet, FORBES, Apr. 2007, at 68,
72, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0423/068-print.html.
31. For a fuller explanation of the price discrimination concept, see NUECHTERLEIN
& WEISER, supra note 8, at 176-77.
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From the perspective of network operators, the ability to use price
discrimination strategies represents a potential new revenue opportunity
that can enable them to recoup investments in network upgrades. In
general, firms investing a significant amount of money in a fixed cost asset
(whether it be building a movie theatre, deploying a broadband network, or
developing a blockbuster drug) look for opportunities to make money at the
back end.32 For movie theatre owners, for example, one effective version
of price discrimination is to charge high prices for popcorn, thereby
enabling them to make more money off consumers with more discretionary
income and effectively subsidize other consumers' ability to go to the
movies. Similarly, as some analysts have noted, broadband network
providers must identify additional revenue opportunities to justify
investments necessary to upgrade broadband infrastructure.
33
The negative associations with price discrimination often reflect the
concern-at least in the telecommunications environment-that
telecommunications providers (unlike airlines or movie theatres) cannot be
trusted with the freedom to set prices in a flexible manner. This concern is
highlighted by former AT&T CEO Ed Whitacre's now-famous description
of how he viewed Google:
Now what [Google and other Internet content providers] would like to do
is use my pipes free, but I ain't going to let them do that because we
have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there's
going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these
pipes to pay for the portion they're using. Why should they be allowed
to use my pipes?
34
Whitacre's statement is bizarre on many levels (even putting aside the
fact that it was an enormous public relations faux pas), starting with the
fact that Google does not use much bandwidth for its search application
and that its effective search technology has added enormous value to-and
demand for-AT&T's broadband network. Indeed, if there were to be a
32. See Hahn & Wallsten, supra note 15, at 4 ("The need to cover fixed costs, coupled
with society's interest in having platform operators internalize the benefits that accrue to
both sides of the market [i.e., the broadband provider and applications developers], suggests
that these providers should have maximum price flexibility to encourage innovation.");
see also Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model
for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 81 (2007) (explaining the
importance of allowing recovery of front-end fixed cost investments).
33. See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PREDICTIONS: TMT
TRENDS 2007, 7 (2007), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/
dttTelecomPredictions0 I I107.pdf ("Clearly, something has to change in the economics of
Internet access, such that network operators and ISPs can continue to invest in new
infrastructure and maintain service quality, and consumers can continue to enjoy the Internet
as they know it today.").
34. Patricia O'Connell, At SBC, It's All About "Scale and Scope, " Bus. WK. ONLINE,




revenue payment between AT&T and Google for the relevant value added
functionality, it is not at all clear that the money would flow from Google
to AT&T (as opposed to vice versa).
The more benign view of price discrimination is represented by how
Richard Notebaert, Qwest's former CEO, explained the issue. Notebaert,
unlike Whitacre, acknowledged that Google and Amazon are valued
customers whose applications enhance the value of Qwest's DSL product.
To Notebaert, however, the ability to charge additional fees for premium
services was just like Federal Express's premium fee charged for
guaranteed holiday delivery. 35 Even though few such deals are public, one
can readily imagine win-win deals where a video applications provider
contracts for guaranteed delivery speeds (say three megabits per second) to
all broadband customers-even if a particular broadband subscriber only
pays for a lower level of bandwidth for best efforts Internet access (say 512
kilobits per second). Indeed, BellSouth (now part of AT&T) reportedly
entered into such an arrangement with Movielink, assuring it greater levels
of bandwidth for customers using BellSouth's service in return for a fee. In
principle, this deal enabled BellSouth to discount Internet access for some
customers while enabling a provider of valuable content to subsidize the
more effective delivery of its product to particular customers.36
C. The Limits of Laissez-Faire
The rejoinder to the emphasis on preserving the Internet's open
architecture through network neutrality regulation is the claim that any
regulatory program will, as commentator Randy May put it, "stifle new
investment and innovation in broadband networks. 37 In particular, May
and others claim that robust competition in the broadband marketplace will
prevent firms from acting in an anticompetitive fashion. The reality,
however, is that the search for the third broadband pipe-i.e., an alternative
to cable modem and DSL connections-is ongoing, and the broadband
access marketplace is largely a duopoly. In this respect, the broadband
market differs from that of, for example, overnight delivery both in that
U.S. post office "best effort" delivery is regulated and there is considerable
35. See Marguerite Reardon, Qwest CEO Supports Tiered Internet, ZDNET, Mar. 15,
2006, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035-22-6050109.html (explaining Notebaert's analogy
that like Federal Express and UPS, broadband providers should be afforded the opportunity
to enter into similar guaranteed service delivery deals).
36. For a discussion of this issue, see PHILIP J. WEISER, THE FUTURE OF VIDEO: NEW
APPROACHES TO COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 19 (2007), available at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-8DF23CA704F5%7
D/C&STHEFUTUREOFVIDEO.PDF.
37. Press Release, Progress & Freedom Found., PFF's May Warns of Effects of
Network Neutrality Provision, (Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.pff.org/news/news/
2006/042506maynetneutrality.html.
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competition in the overnight delivery market (there are at least four
facilities-based providers). Policies and technological changes may well
facilitate the development of wireless broadband platforms, 38 but the advent
of wireless broadband remains a promise, not a reality. Consequently, it is
a stretch to invoke this possibility as a basis for claiming that broadband
markets are, even if not competitive, then at least contestable.
39
Even if broadband providers continue to possess market power, they still
benefit from the applications that ride on their networks and, consequently,
have a powerful incentive not to undermine the creation of innovative
applications. To explain the implications of this insight, Joe Farrell and I
detailed the logic behind the "internalization of complementary
efficiencies" (ICE) principle. In essence, the ICE principle explains why
there are powerful incentives for platform monopolists or oligopolists to
support a wide array of applications. There are, however, a number of
exceptions to the ICE principle. 40 For present purposes, let me focus on
two such exceptions: (1) the incentive to undermine an application that can
compete with the core platform; and (2) the dynamics of price
discrimination.
For even a casual observer of the network neutrality debate, the concept
that Internet-based applications can compete with a platform provider's
core product offering (e.g., legacy voice or video revenues) is a familiar
one. As network neutrality proponents regularly remind policymakers, the
case involving Madison River Communications-a rural telephone
company that resorted to the extreme tactic of blocking Vonage's VoIP
service41-illustrates this exception to ICE. For Madison River
Communications, the interest in protecting current voice-based revenues
made its case for blocking VoIP services quite compelling. As one
observer explained, this sort of interest tempts carriers to protect legacy
revenue streams by using "dodgy competitive tactic[s]," such as "slow[ing]
down Vonage's service" or "giv[ing] network precedence to their own
38. For a discussion of spectrum regulation and how it limits efficient entry, see
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 8, at ch. 7.
39. Wu & Yoo, supra note 9, at 588 (explicating Yoo's argument that wireless
broadband platforms provide a basis for the contestability argument).
40. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 89-90 (listing exceptions to the ICE
principle).
41. Madison River Comnc'ns, LLC, Consent Decree, 20 F.C.C.R. 4296 (2005),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf. There
have been some examples abroad as well. See, e.g., Cho Jin-seo, Cable TV Operators Block
HanaTV, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/
article.asp?parentid=55961 (reporting that cable providers had blocked Internet-based
television services).
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revenue-generating services. *42 Consequently, unless sufficient competition
develops to punish firms for degrading particular applications to protect
legacy revenue sources, it is difficult to accept a categorical claim that the
possibility of anticompetitive conduct in the broadband marketplace is not
a plausible policy concern.
The possibility of anticompetitive conduct through exclusive dealing
arrangements is a familiar competition policy concern. At least in the case
of upstart firms, however, there are powerful policy reasons to believe that
such arrangements can be procompetitive. Consider, for example, the
reported arrangement between Clearwire and Bell Canada, which required
the upstart wireless broadband operator to make Bell Canada the preferred
(and perhaps only) provider of VoIP service on its network. 43  That
arrangement, which appeared to involve either blocking or degrading rival
VoIP services, arguably played a role in enabling the upstart to attract
financing and support as well as to offer a tailored VoIP offering. In
general, whether exclusive dealing arrangements between a platform
provider and applications developers are procompetitive or anticompetitive
is a complex issue and a matter of considerable debate.44 Consequently, it
is quite plausible that, in some cases, such arrangements create real
efficiencies and should be tolerated on that ground.
Whether the dynamics of price discrimination justify regulatory
oversight cannot be determined on a categorical basis. The case for
tolerating price discrimination tactics emphasizes that they are an effective
means of capturing the revenue necessary to justify high fixed cost
investments. In those cases, such as higher fares for business travelers and
high-priced popcorn at movie theatres, any effort to ban price
discrimination would have the impact of raising the price of otherwise
lower-priced offerings (e.g., plane tickets and movie prices), leaving
42. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 8, at 571 n.15 (quoting Daniel Klein, Why
Vonage Is Just a Fad, ZDNET, May 19, 2004, http://techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/
stories/main/WhyVonageJustFad.html).
43, See Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 8, at 58 (describing the nature of the
arrangement).
44. For a very thoughtful discussion of the issue, see Robin S. Lee, Vertical Integration
and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets (NET Institute, Working Paper No.
07-39, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1022682. In particular, Lee analyzes the
sixth generation game console market with respect to the arrangement between the platform
providers (console makers) and applications developers (game producers). Based on his
analysis, he concludes that the use of exclusive arrangements facilitated successful entry by
upstarts and thus gave rise to dynamic efficiency benefits. Viewed through a merely static
lens, by contrast, he suggests that a ban on exclusive vertical arrangements would benefit
consumers. He explains, however, that this conclusion is potentially misleading insofar as it
presumes the dynamic benefits (i.e., increased entry) that might not occur in the absence of
such arrangements. Id. at 4. For a related analysis of the countervailing factors involved in
regulating platform competition, see Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and
Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLM. L. REV. 534 (2003).
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consumers worse off and lowering overall output. At the same time, some
price discrimination arrangements may come at an unacceptable cost-
such as crippled functionality of a relevant product-that constitutes, in Joe
Farrell's words, "collateral damage."45
For opponents of network neutrality, a core challenge is to justify
pro-consumer business strategies that on their face appear to limit the
availability of applications to protect legacy revenues, enable new products
or services to be launched, facilitate price discrimination, or some
combination of the above. In many cases, the relevant strategies will limit
the product's functionality so that consumers are not able to use cheaper
offerings. Consider, for example, the practices of the wireless carriers
related to VoP offerings: the major U.S. carriers specify in their contracts
that VolP is not a permitted use of their wireless broadband offerings.46 In
Europe, carriers have gone one step further, restricting the functionality of
wireless devices by removing the VoIP capability built into the handset.47
For network neutrality advocates, the challenge is to demonstrate that
restrictions, such as those imposed by wireless providers, harm consumers
and require ex ante regulation. To make the case for network neutrality
regulation, it is essential to explain (1) what sort of practices fall into the
anticompetitive camp (as opposed to the procompetitive one); and (2) why
preventing anticompetitive forms of price discrimination is best
accomplished through front-end prophylactic rules rather than a more
targeted form of oversight. In the wireless case, for example, the
restrictions might be justified on the ground that the carriers subsidize the
cost of the device and thus must be able to anticipate a certain level of
revenues to do so. To make the case that such restrictions are unjustifiable
as reasonable (and procompetitive) price discrimination, Tim Wu
highlights that the wireless carriers do not sell unlocked, open, and
unsubsidized devices as an alternative to the restricted, closed, and
subsidized ones. 48 This observation, while important, hardly undermines
the plausibility of legitimate justifications for the restrictions imposed by
wireless carriers. Consequently, even if complete faith in the conduct of
platform providers is unjustified, complete skepticism is also inappropriate.
45. Joseph Farrell, Open Access Arguments: Why Confidence Is Misplaced, in NET
NEUTRALITY OR NET NEUTERING: SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGULATED?
195, 200 (Thomas M. Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006).
46. Tim Wu, Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone and Consumer Choice in
Mobile Broadband 13 (New America Foundation: Wireless Future Program, Working Paper
No. 17, 2007), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaperl7-Wireless
NetNeutrality_Wu.pdf.
47. Bill Ray, Orange and Vodafone Cripple Nokia 's Flagship, THE REGISTER, Apr. 18,
2007, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/04/18/n95 crippled/.
48. See Wu, supra note 46, at 24.
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D. Raising the Level of the Debate
The move of the network neutrality debate from Capitol Hill to the FCC
and FTC provides an opportunity to tone down the rhetoric and shift the
focus of discussion to important consumer protection and competition
policy issues. In short, I am skeptical that Congress can craft well-
specified legislation in this area, but at the same time, I am reasonably
confident that both the FCC and the FTC possess the necessary authority to
address network neutrality concerns using their current legislative
mandates.
In terms of the search for legislative solutions, the early congressional
debates over the issue underscore the difficulties of evaluating a cutting
edge policy issue before it is more carefully considered by expert agencies
and policy analysts. In particular, the political dynamics at work led to
opposing bills that took fairly extreme approaches. On one side, a 2006 bill
championed by Congressman Barton threatened to curtail existing FCC
authority and limit its jurisdiction to a narrow mandate. On the other side,
a 2006 bill championed by Congressman Markey greatly restricted the
ability of broadband providers to offer and charge for higher QoS levels.
Viewed together, the two bills reflect the confidence of both network
neutrality proponents and opponents in diagnosing the state of the
marketplace, as neither of them developed a regulatory strategy for
conditions of uncertainty when plausible competition concerns are far from
definitive. 9
Congressional action in the network neutrality area is unnecessary
because the current state of FCC authority on broadband regulation is
considerably broader and more stable than is often appreciated. In
particular, the FCC has classified broadband as a Title I information service
subject to its ancillary jurisdictional authority.50 This regulatory category
49. During 2006, for example, it became difficult to keep track of the network
neutrality proposals without a scorecard. For such a scorecard, see Anne Broache, Net
Neutrality Field in Congress Gets Crowded, CNET NEWS.COM, May 19, 2006,
http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-6074564.html. In general, the bills fit into either the
camp of imposing severe restrictions on network operators or in limiting the scope of
authorized regulation. Like Congressman Markey's bill (Network Neutrality Act of 2006,
H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. (2006)), Senators Snowe and Dorgan proposed a bill (Internet
Freedom Preservation Act, S. 2917, 109th Cong. (2006)) that prohibited the prioritization of
Internet traffic for a fee. Like Congressman Barton's bill (Communications Opportunity,
Promotion, and Enhancement Act, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006)), Senator Stevens
introduced a bill (Communications, Consumer's Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. (2006)) that limited the scope of FCC authority and called for
further study of the issue.
50. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974
(2005) (upholding classification of cable modem service as an "information service");
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,862 (2005)
(classifying DSL connections as an "information service").
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offers the agency considerable flexibility in devising an appropriate
regulatory strategy-meaning that it is hardly the case that the agency lacks
authority to regulate broadband platforms and that, without congressional
authorization, is unable to do so. Notably, the Supreme Court emphasized
this point in National Cable & Telecom Ass 'n v. Brand X lnternet Services,
explaining that "the Commission remains free to impose special regulatory
duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction" and
noting that the agency had already begun to do so.5" Consequently, if
Congress does act in this area, a bill along the lines proposed by
Congressman Markey in 2008-authorizing the FCC to undertake an
investigation of network management practices (among other things)52 -is
a far sounder course than either of the more extreme courses pursued in
2006.
Another result of the FCC's decision to classify broadband as a Title I
information service is that it not only left the agency with considerable
discretion on how to regulate broadband, but also authorized the FTC to
oversee broadband service providers. On account of an antiquated
statutory constraint, the FTC is not authorized to oversee the conduct of
"telecommunications providers," who are treated as "common carriers"
under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. 53 This constraint no
longer applies to broadband services, thereby enabling the FTC to oversee
the conduct of broadband providers. 4 Moreover, because state public
utility commissions, which traditionally address consumer protection issues
as to telecommunications providers, may well lack jurisdiction in this
area, 55 it is important that the FTC step into the breach. Part II of this
Article suggests just how the FTC should do so, and Part III proceeds to
discuss how the two agencies should address competition policy concerns.
51. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 996. James Speta has argued that Brand X misconstrues the
scope of the FCC's authority, but I disagree. Compare James B. Speta, FCC Authority to
Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15 (2003), with
Weiser, Toward a Next Generation, supra note 8, at 85.
52. The text of Congressman Markey's proposed Internet Freedom Preservation Act is
available at http://markey.house.gov/docs/telecomm/hr5353.pdf.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 44,45(a)(2) (2000).
54. See FTC Jurisdiction over Internet Access Services: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 109th Cong. 3 n.4 (2006) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(2) (2000)) (prepared
statement of the Federal Trade Commission), available at http://www.fRc.gov/os/2006/06
/P052103CommissionTestimonyReBroadbandlnternetAccessServices06l42006Senate.pdf;
see also Reconsidering Our Communications Laws. Ensuring Competition and Innovation.:
Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.pff
.org/issues-pubs/testimony/060616gifford-com.pdf (testimony of Raymond L. Gifford,
President & Senior Fellow, The Progress & Freedom Foundation).
55. Cf Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an
Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 22,404 (2004) (preempting state regulation of VolP).
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II. A CONSUMER PROTECTION STRATEGY FOR BROADBAND REGULATION
One of the shortcomings of today's broadband policy is that it does not
seek to promote greater consumer awareness of broadband offerings and
enforce carrier representations. Particularly as the marketplace evolves and
competition policy issues become more challenging, policymakers need to
ensure that broadband providers state clearly what consumers can expect
from their offerings. By so doing, consumers will not only be assured that
they receive reasonable service, but application providers will be in a better
position to manage their offerings and compete based on an understanding
of how the marketplace is evolving.
At present, most consumers are not well-informed about the state of their
broadband service and, to the extent that network providers engage in any
form of prioritization (or even blocking of particular applications),
consumers are generally unaware of the existence of such prioritization.
The significance of this issue became clear in the fall of 2007 when
Comcast reportedly blocked or degraded BitTorrent and other peer-to-peer
applications. In response to these reports, Comcast claimed that, although
it had not previously disclosed this practice, it was engaging in reasonable
network management. Going forward, this is likely to emerge as a more
significant issue as technologies develop that prioritize different forms of
Internet traffic and carriers increasingly adopt such technologies. From the
consumer perspective, it is critical that consumers stay informed about the
relevant offerings because this places them in a position to demand
particular levels of performance.
As Justice Brandeis famously put it, "sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants. '' 56  Whether the issue is federal regulatory policy or
ingredients used in fast food, disclosure can often keep participants honest
and enable parties to protect themselves.57 In the Internet environment, the
potential role of consumers as safeguards is quite powerful. Indeed, as
FTC Chairman Majoras identified in the "Protecting Consumers in the
58Next Tech-Ade" hearing, consumers have played a valuable checking
function on a number of occasions, including pressuring Facebook to give
users the option of turning off a feature that some believed invaded their
56. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62
(1933).
57. As a former FTC Bureau of Competition put it: "Agencies enhance understanding
of the process and foster better antitrust risk assessment by companies when they explain
why they decided to act or not to act. Transparency matters. Critical review of agency
performance and of outcomes is not possible without access to information." U.S. Merger
Enforcement Policy, Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n 12-13 (2005),
available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/BaerStatement.pdf (testimony
of William J. Baer, Partner and Chair of the Antitrust Practice, Arnold & Porter, LLP).
58. Transcripts from "Protecting Consumers in the Next Tech-Ade," are available at
http://www.ftc.gov/techade.
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privacy.59 Whereas that scenario involved a feature that was open and
notorious, the challenge in the broadband Internet access context is that the
potentially objectionable network features may well be subtle and not
readily apparent. To address the challenge, the FTC needs to oversee the
implementation and enforcement of both effective disclosure requirements
and enforcement processes. This Part discusses each issue in turn.
A. The Role of the FTC in Requiring Disclosure of Broadband
Service Offerings
The nature of broadband Internet access is not always clear to
consumers, and as noted above, firms operate in a largely unregulated
climate. As an initial regulatory safeguard, the FTC should develop a
consumer education and consumer protection enforcement initiative in this
area. As explained below, I recommend a three part strategy.
First, the FTC should develop some basic guidance as to what
information is important for consumers to understand vis-d-vis their
broadband Internet access connections. Generally, most consumers focus
on the "speed" or bandwidth that a provider can offer to the exclusion of
other factors. Thus, as an initial matter, companies should inform
consumers of the effective level of bandwidth (as opposed to a
hypothetically possible level of bandwidth) provided by their broadband
connection. Indeed, some providers are less than forthcoming on this
score, as some evaluations have determined that the "actual speeds of large
providers [were] somewhere between 150 Kbit/s and 200 Kbit/s.... [A] far
cry from the two, three or even four megabit download speeds frequently
hyped in ISP marketing literature. 60
In disclosing the relevant speeds provided by broadband services, one
controversial practice is the use of often misleading "up to" claims. During
the hearings held by the FTC, former Chairman Tim Muris defended the
use of such claims, positing that "the reason that such claims are effective
[and not misleading] is that consumers understand that 'up to' claims are
59. Anne Broache, FTC Chief Warns Against 'Unnecessary' Net Rules, CNET
NEWS.COM, Jan. 2, 2007, http://news.com.com/FTC+chief+warns+against+unnecessary+
Net+rules/2100-1028_3-6132772.html.
60. Art Reisman, Analysis: The White Lies ISPs Tell About Broadband Speeds,
PCMAG.COM, July 5, 2007, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,2155140,00.asp. To the
same end, an AT&T Group President reported, based on that company's test of 150 cable
modems in ohe market, that "[e]ven though peak speeds averaged around 3 Mbps during
periods of low congestion, still far below the 6 to 8 Mbps speeds, average speeds hovered
around 300 kbps to 400 kbps." Cynthia Brumfield, AT&T: Sample Cable Modem Speeds




not the same as 'average' claims and, thus, will discount the claims
accordingly." 61 Although plausible, this suggestion rests on an unproven
empirical foundation and a belief that most consumers are relatively
sophisticated about technology. Even if some consumers are sophisticated
enough to appreciate the difference between "average" and "up to" speeds,
others may well conflate these two concepts. Reflecting its concern in this
regard, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC)
cautioned broadband providers against making "up to" claims of bandwidth
availability where the basis of such claims was theoretical possibility and
not practical availability on a regular basis. Moreover, to avoid engaging
in misleading or deceptive claims, the ACCC mandated that ISPs
substantiate stated maximums that users can achieve and, moreover,
recommended the advertising of a "typical range of speeds. 62 Similarly,
Ofcom, the U.K. independent regulator and competition authority for the
communications industries, "ruled that broadband providers could use the
words 'up to' 8[ megabits per second] when describing services as long as
customers were likely to get close to those speeds. 63 In particular, Ofcom
found that even for providers advertising speeds of "up to 8Mbps," the
average speed "was 2.7Mbps, with the lowest coming in at under
0.09Mbps, barely at dial-up rates, and the maximum only reaching
6.7Mbps.
' 64
For consumers, the "speed" of broadband connections may be a
paramount consideration, but it is often not-and should not be-the only
relevant concern. Notably, consumers are often interested in and should be
informed about whether guaranteed QoS assurances are available either to
them or to providers delivering content or services over the network.65 In
particular, in addition to disclosing the availability of any such
arrangements, broadband providers should explain whether particular
offerings are suitable for real-time applications (such as voice
communications or video conferencing) and whether they are selling
applications providers QoS assurances such that those services can be
61. BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, supra note 3, at 132.
62. Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Broadband Internet Speed
Claims and Trade Practices Act 1974 5 (2007), available at http://www.iia.net.au/docs/
BroadbandSpeedClaims.pdf.
63. Britain 'Failing' Net Speed Tests, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6924866.stm.
64. Id.
65. Such assurances, significantly, are likely to address issues related to latency and
jitter as well as available bandwidth.
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delivered effectively.66 In providing this information, it is critical that
broadband providers do so in a manner that ordinary consumers
understand.67
Second, it is important that consumers understand the network
management policies used by their broadband provider. It is a given that
broadband providers must manage their networks, and it is quite likely (and
healthy) for them to use different strategies to do so. For example, peer-to-
peer video traffic may well consume as much as 50% to 60% of available
bandwidth while serving only a limited number of consumers.68 Whether
or not this figure is accurate, the potential for some applications to be
"bandwidth hogs" underscores that there are legitimate reasons that
broadband providers will need to give priority to certain applications over
others and vendors are indeed developing routers to do just that. 69 My
point is not only that regulators should welcome such practices, but should
also ensure that, to the extent firms embrace them, these firms should
disclose the nature of such practices to their customers.7 ° Similarly, the
66. To the extent that a broadband Internet access service is likely to be limited in any
regard such that it cannot support commonly used applications effectively, it is important
that such limitations be conspicuously disclosed. See NETWORK RELIABILITY AND
INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL VII, BROADBAND ARCHITECTURES, BEST PRACTICES & SERVICE
FEATURES FOR THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH-SPEED RESIDENTIAL INTERNET ACCESS
SERVICE 15 (2005), available at http://www.nric.org/meetings/docs/meeting-20051019/
NRICVII_FG4_FinalReportSeptember_2005.pdf (noting the expectation that broadband
connections feature levels of latency low enough to be compatible with commonly used
applications).
67. This concern is also true in related contexts, such as online privacy policies. See, e.g.,
Louise Story, F.T.C. Takes a Look at Web Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C8,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/l l/02/technology/O2adco.html?_r-1l&oref=slogin
(reporting FTC Commissioner Leibowitz's call for standard privacy rules, noting that in a
survey, only 1% of high school educated consumers can understand privacy policies of large
companies).
68. See PHILIP J. WEISER, REPORT FROM THE CENTER FOR NEW WEST PUTTING
NETWORK NEUTRALITY IN PERSPECTIVE 5 (2007), http://www.centerfomewwest.org/pdf/
TelecomSummary.pdf; Lucas van Grinsven, Google and Cable Firms Warn of Risks from Web
TV, USATODAY.COM, Feb. 7, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-02-07-google-
web-tvx.htm (citing the Gartner report that 60% of Internet traffic is peer-to-peer video).
69. See, e.g., CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., CISCO SERVICE CONTROL APPLICATION FOR
BROADBAND: USER GUIDE VERSION 3.0.5 (2006), http://www.cisco.com/application/pdf/en/
us/guest/products/ps6135/cl626/ccmigration-09186a008078a9fl.pdf (outlining the Cisco
SCE 2000 product, which recognizes 600 different protocols and allows for controlling
traffic by treating different applications differently). Similarly, Packeteer has developed a
system for identifying and managing traffic. See PACKETEER, APPLICATION LIST (2007),
http://www.packeteer.com/resources/prod-sol/ApplicationDiscovery.pdf.
70. A Network Reliability and Interoperability Council working paper elaborated on
recommended disclosure practices, explaining that:
Service providers should make information available to customers that
include[s] content filtering ....
Service [p]roviders should make available meaningful information about
expected performance with respect to upstream and downstream throughput and
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FTC should also encourage broadband providers to disclose to consumers
any monitoring of their communications, including those required by law,
such as the Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act.
In the case of Comcast's treatment of BitTorrent, the lack of any
transparent policy as to its network management practices created
considerable alarm among network neutrality advocates. Notably, Comcast
did not mention that it subjected peer-to-peer applications to any Internet
management techniques, but simply warned consumers against "excess"
uses of bandwidth. 71  However, an Electronic Freedom Foundation (EFF)
report-following an earlier Associated Press story that reported
difficulties in using BitTorrent to download a copy of the King James Bible
via a Comcast cable modem--concluded that Comcast was using a
technique that it called "packet forgery" as a means of causing peer-to-peer
connections to shut down.72 In response, Comcast defended its actions as
"reasonable network management" and maintained that the company does
not block packets.73 A New York Times reporter, however, stated that a
any limitations of the service; best effort services "up to" or unspecified bit rates
services should be specified as such in a clearly identifiable manner.
Service providers should make available meaningful information about
expected performance with respect to upstream and downstream throughput and
any limitations of the service. Specified rate services (such as those covered by
QoS or similar systems) should be handled by an SLA between the parties.
Doug Davis, NETWORK RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL VI: Focus
GROUP 4-BROADBAND 10 app.a (2003), http://www.nric.org/fg/charter-vi/fg4/NRIC6FG4-
Completed.pdf.
71. See Drew Clark, Comcast and Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information,
DREWCLARK.COM, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.drewclark.com/comcast-and-freedom-to-
obtain-service-plan-information/ (stating that Comcast warns consumers that they may not
"inhibit, interfere with, or degrade any other user's use of the Service, nor represent (in the
sole judgment of Comcast) an overly large burden on the network"); see also Drew Clark,
Highlights from the Terms of Service of the Largest Broadband Providers,
DREWCLARK.COM, http://www.drewclark.com/tosmatrix.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2008)
(providing a comparison of several major broadband providers' terms of service).
72. PETER ECKERSLEY ET AL., PACKET FORGERY BY ISPs: A REPORT ON THE COMCAST
AFFAIR, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 2007, available at http://www.eff.org/
files/effcomcast-report2.pdf.
73. See Grant Gross, EFF: Comcast Continues to Block P-to-P, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/l 1/30/AR2007113001543
.html (reporting on Comcast's response). Taking issue with Comcast's claim, the EFF
report suggested that Comcast's position that its network management techniques did not
block packets is "only true under special conditions, and is certainly not true in general."
ECKERSLEY ET AL., supra note 72, at 5. In support of Comcast, another commentator
explained that Comcast was using a reasonable network management technique:
We can think of [Comcast's restrictions on peer-to-peer traffic] as a freeway
onramp that has lights on it to rate limit the number of cars that may enter a
freeway. Those lights aren't there to say people of a certain race can pass through
or people of a certain race must wait longer in line; everyone must wait their turn.
If you didn't have the lights and everyone tries to pile on to the freeway at the same
time, everyone ends up with worse traffic. Comcast doesn't block you from using
BitTorrent, it simply limits the number of simultaneous uploads you can perform at
once.
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Comcast official acknowledged that "the company occasionally-but not
always--delays some peer-to-peer file transfers that eat into Internet speeds
for other users on the network.,
74
There are two related consumer protection lessons that emerge from the
Comcast/BitTorrent controversy. First, it is critical that broadband
providers make clear what restrictions they place on Internet use so that
consumers can make informed choices. At present, this is rarely the case.
As one report explained, "the bottom line is all providers require residential
customers to agree not to use too much bandwidth, but very few actually
specify how much is too much. 75 Second, to the extent that firms engage
in network management, it is essential that they disclose the nature of such
techniques or, at a minimum, allow a trusted party to judge the
reasonableness of such techniques.
In the Comcast/BitTorrent dispute, Comcast has suggested that its lack
of disclosure reflects a concern that it must keep its network management
practices a secret so as to prevent gaming. Assuming that this is indeed the
case, 76 the absence of any forum-the FTC, the FCC, or a trusted third
party-to evaluate the reasonableness of such techniques becomes a real
problem for consumers who have no basis to evaluate whether their
provider is acting reasonably. It is possible, for example, that Comcast's
network management techniques are unreasonable on the grounds that they
are overbroad and that the company failed to "exhaust the reasonable,
user-friendly, and standards-compliant responses"'77 before taking more
George Ou, A Rational Debate on Comcast Traffic Management, ZDNET, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=852&page=2 [hereinafter Ou, Comcast Traffic Management].
74. Brad Stone, Comcast: We're Delaying, Not Blocking, BitTorrent Traffic, N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG, Oct. 22, 2007, http:/ibits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/comcast-were-
delaying-not-blocking-bittorrent-traffic.
75. Randy Barrett, Putting the Squeeze on Bandwidth Hogs: How Operators Deal with
Their Greediest Users, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 7, 2007, available at http://www
.multichannel.com/article/CA6439454.html ("Of nine service providers surveyed by
Multichannel News, only three-Cox Communications, Shaw Communications and Qwest
Communications International-explicitly state limits.").
76. See ECKERSLEY ET AL., supra note 72, at 8-9 (acknowledging that this claim is
subject to question, as purportedly secret network management techniques can be discerned
and reported in Internet-based chat groups, leading to an arms race of sorts between network
owners and hackers).
77. Id. at 7-8. Ed Felten, a respected technologist, similarly criticizes Comcast's choice
of network management techniques, concluding that:
There are well-established mechanisms for dealing with traffic congestion on
the Internet. Networks are supposed to respond to congestion by dropping packets;
endpoint computers notice that their packets are being dropped and respond by
slowing their transmissions, thus relieving the congestion....
What Comcast is doing instead is to cut off connections by sending forged TCP
Reset packets to the endpoints.... Doing this is a violation of the TCP protocol,
which has at least two ill effects: it bypasses TCP's well-engineered mechanisms
for handling congestion, and it erodes the usefulness of Reset packets as true
indicators of error.
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aggressive measures. Such a judgment, however, is impossible to make in
the absence of either disclosure as to the technique being used or the
availability of a trusted body to determine that the measure is reasonable. 8
In short, given the current state of affairs-an undisclosed network
management technique and no body to evaluate the reasonableness of such
a technique-Comcast consumers are left in the dark and frustrated when
their broadband provider does not live up to its promised terms of service.79
Consequently, as one reporter put it, "[i]n the absence of a transparent
explanation about what the company does to disadvantage certain
applications in the name of managing traffic on its network, anecdotal
reports and conspiracy theories are filling the vacuum."80
As policymakers develop a regulatory regime to fill the vacuum
highlighted in the Comcast episode, it is essential that they develop a
mechanism to ensure that consumers can rely on accurate representations
Edward W. Felten, Comcast Blocks Some Traffic, Won't Explain Itself, FREEDOM To
TINKER, Oct. 23, 2007, available at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1 217.
78. A provider of video programming using peer-to-peer technology, Vuze, has
petitioned the FCC to evaluate setting rules governing reasonable network management,
suggesting that any forms of blocking, degradation, or unreasonable discrimination are
illegitimate. See Petition to Establish Rules Governing Network Management Practices by
Broadband Network Operators, WC Docket 07-52 (Nov. 14, 2007),, available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/vuze-petition-20071114.pdf. On the merits of this
issue, some commentators suggest that there is reason to believe that Comcast's choice of
network management techniques was appropriate. As George Ou reported (based on a
conversation with Richard Bennett):
Simply put, there is no queue for you to prioritize in the first place on a cable
broadband network. [Resorting to forged packets] isn't the prettiest solution in the
world but there is nothing pretty about a shared collision domain network topology
and there aren't any other solutions other than active network management.
Conventional QoS (Quality of Service) priority queuing works on a router which
comprises most of the Internet, but it has no effect on a shared last-mile collision
domain network where packets are simply discarded if they collide. Simply put,
there is no queue for you to prioritize in the first place. Actively managing the
number of simultaneous uploads cable broadband BitTorrent users improves
performance for everyone and every application including BitTorrent.
Ou, Comcast Traffic Management, supra note 73. For Bennett's own defense of Comcast,
see Edward Felton, Ed Felton's Alternate Internet, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOG, Oct. 23,
2007, http://bennett.com/blog/index.php/archives/2007/10/23/ed-felten-alternate-internet,
saying:
Nothing in the conventional arsenal of TCP effectively limits BitTorrent's appetite
for bandwidth, it's all up to the user. And if he's a hog, it's out of control.
Fundamentally, the problem that Comcast addresses with its TCP RSTs isn't an
Internet problem, it's an Intranet problem, as in the DOCSIS network inside
Comcast doesn't handle high loads of upstream traffic without going unstable.
See also Larry Seltzer, Network Policies Should Be Open, Not Neutral, EWEEK.COM, Nov. 6,
2007, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2213092,00.asp ("In fact, rate-limiting is a
common-sense practice with a service like BitTorrent, which can create a constant baseline
of traffic across a network.").
79. See Seltzer, supra note 78 ("The problem here isn't limiting bandwidth, its [sic]
dishonesty and a failure to disclose procedures.").
80. Stone, supra note 74.
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by broadband providers. In the case of wireless services, for example,
Verizon initially suggested that they supported "full" Bluetooth
capabilities. After a series of customer complaints and a class action
lawsuit alleging that Bluetooth functionality was restricted, however,
Verizon dropped its claim and acknowledged that it greatly limits the
potential uses of Bluetooth.8 1 In the wake of a complaint filed at the FCC,
a barrage of criticism in the press, and a few lawsuits, Comcast ultimately
announced a change in its terms of service, acknowledging in very broad
terms the type of network management techniques that it uses.82
The third element of my recommended consumer protection strategy is
that broadband providers should be expected to offer some level of
traditional best efforts Internet access when they sell "broadband" Internet
access. As noted earlier in this section, I believe that paid access for QoS
guarantees through de facto "fast lanes" of Internet access is a pro-
consumer development and one that should not be banned. I also believe,
however, that the continued offering of best efforts broadband is critical to
(1) providing consumers what they expect from broadband Internet access,
and (2) enabling application developers to build new products without first
having to enter into arrangements to ensure a reliable level of QoS.
83
To ensure that the preservation of best efforts Internet access continues,
providers should not be able to use the term "broadband" without offering a
sufficient level of best efforts connectivity, as that is what consumers have
come to expect. Over time, the relevant level of best efforts connectivity
will need to evolve, as evinced by the fact that the FCC's early definition of
broadband-at least 200 kilobits per second-is increasingly archaic in a
world where few broadband consumers subscribe to such connections. If
the FTC chooses not to insist on a level of continuing best efforts delivery,
it should pay close attention to a broadband provider's disclosures as to
what methods of prioritization are used and ensure, perhaps through a
conspicuous disclaimer, that consumers appreciate that the traditional best
efforts Internet delivery is not offered by that provider.84
81. See Wu, supra note 46, at 11.
82. Comcast's terms of service can be found at http://www.comcast.net/terns/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2008). For a discussion of Comcast's revised terms of service, see Eric
Bangeman, Comcast Tweaks Terms of Service in Wake of Throttling Uproar, ARS
TECHNICA, Feb. 7, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080207-comcast-tweaks-
terms-of-service-in-wake-of-throttling-uproar.html.
83. The USC Annenberg Center's Network Neutrality principles called this "Basic
Access Broadband," defining it as "a meaningful, neutral Internet connectivity service."
http://www.boingboing.net/2006/03/24/principles-for-netwo.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2008).
84. For a discussion of different systems of prioritization, see Edward W. Felten, Nuts
and Bolts of Network Neutrality, in 24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS




In addition to "best efforts" broadband, firms are likely to use two other
delivery paths. First, firms will also be in a position to sell prioritized
Internet access-the sale of such access on a discriminatory basis might
well raise competitive concerns (as discussed in Part III). Second,
broadband providers will almost certainly use their own "private network"
and Internet technology to deliver their own services, such as IP television
or VolP. As to such services, it is prudent to leave them outside of any
regulatory oversight-provided that independent providers are still able to
compete. By contrast, if broadband providers seek to avoid the oversight
of discriminatory access to QoS assurances by calling the relevant service a
private network-based one, the prudence of a forbearance strategy as to the
regulatory oversight of private, network-based services will need to be
revisited.
B. The Role of Effective Disclosure, Self-Regulation, and
FTC Enforcement
In essence, I believe that the FTC can contribute greatly to broadband
policy by promoting a truth-in-advertising model and encouraging industry
self-regulation along the lines of its efforts with respect to Internet
privacy. 85 The premise of this model would be the development of clear
broadband usage policies that would be posted on the Web sites of
broadband providers. To facilitate this development, the FTC should
produce a set of guidelines, either formal or informal, for what critical
information providers should post as part of broadband usage policies.86 In
providing a framework or set of principles for broadband terms of service,
the FTC could follow the approach it has used in other contexts, such as
when it issued online behavioral advertising privacy principles to facilitate
both more effective consumer vigilance as well as a program of self-
regulation.87 Based on this framework, the FTC could educate consumers
as to what the usage policies mean, including how they might test to see
whether their provider is providing the type of service that it promises to
85. See Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 2041, 2047 (2000) (recapping the FTC's actions, which led to an increase in the
number of Web sites offering privacy policies).
86. BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, supra note 3, at 137 ("FTC guidance may be useful
should consumers encounter widespread difficulty obtaining or understanding material
information about broadband offerings and service."). Consequently, the FTC concluded
that "we intend to continue to monitor industry practices, and, if appropriate, engage the
industry in discussions of best practices." Id.
87. See FTC, Online Behavioral Advertising: Moving the Discussion Forward to Possible
Self-Regulatory Principles, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/P859900stmt.pdf.
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deliver. Consequently, for cases where a provider is promising one set of
policies and acting differently, the FTC would be positioned to use its
authority to sanction such behavior.
In the broadband arena, the FTC has an important opportunity to spur the
development of an effective disclosure regime.88  Notably, several
regulatory initiatives have spurred more readily understandable and
effectively enforced disclosure requirements that, in turn, have facilitated
competition and benefited consumers. Consider, for example, the
development of competition between snack food providers to offer healthy
snacks. Today, consumers enjoy a variety of products that offer consumers
lower calorie, lower sodium, or lower fat products. But competition for
such products did not emerge until a readily understandable disclosure
regime for nutritional information was developed and implemented.89
From an industry perspective, the ability to make credible commitments
about product quality is a significant factor in encouraging additional
consumption. In the case of restaurants, for example, a program instituted by
the Los Angeles County Health Department requiring the posting of
understandable grade cards evaluating restaurant hygiene led to increased
consumption of restaurant food. The authors of the study documenting this
development explained that such cards led restaurants to improve their hygiene
and enabled consumers to compare between different options more effectively.
As they explained, "the grade cards make consumers more confident about
trying restaurants they have not experienced before and make them less captive
to the restaurants they have had good experiences at."90 Similarly, as
88. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have
to Give Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 41 (2007) (highlighting the need for transparency in the context of technical
protection measures that can restrict uses of digital goods).
89. As Ellen Goodman related,
[I]t seems natural that food manufacturers with a relatively good nutritional story to
tell would disclose nutritional information. Kraft and Nabisco could then compete
on nutritional value or Kraft could use nutritional information to distinguish its
premium brands like Progresso. So one might think, and yet the market did not
produce widespread disclosure of nutritional information until federal regulation
required it. It was the regulation that created a market for nutritional information
that now appears to be strong.
Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REv. 83, 139
(2006) (internal citations omitted); see also Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of
Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Effective? 16-17 (Ash Inst. For Democratic
Governance and Innovation, Harvard Univ., OP-03-04, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=766287 (noting competition based on
nutritional information after government regulation set forth the framework for disclosure).
90. Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Case in Support of Restaurant Hygiene Grade
Cards, 20 CHOICES 97, 100-01 (2005), available -at http://www.stanford.edu/-pleslie/
Jin%20and%2OLeslie%20Choices%202005.pdf ("By increasing the provision of
information to consumers, powerful economic incentives are created for restaurants to
improve hygiene, leading to a significant improvement in public health outcomes.").
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consumers become more appreciative of the different broadband options
available, they will be better able to make informed choices about their
broadband connections and available applications.
Ideally, the FTC will not need to develop a comprehensive regulatory
program, but rather, forums for self-regulation will develop, particularly
with the FTC's encouragement. Given the incentive of applications
developers to measure network performance and monitor whether it
matches the promises of broadband providers, such forums (as well as the
vigilant oversight of many Internet users) can play a constructive role in
determining whether and where performance deviates in practice from what
a particular provider promised. At least initially, the FTC may well need to
take on the responsibility of managing such cases itself. Over time,
however, I believe that there is a role for a self-regulatory dispute
resolution mechanism along the lines of Better Business Bureau's National
Advertising Division (whose decisions are reviewed by the National
Advertising Review Board), 91 which acts as a self-policing mechanism and
refers the truly egregious cases to the FTC for resolution. 92 Moreover,
users themselves may engage in the sort of Net activism that Chairman
91. See BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, supra note 3, at 136 (recognizing the potential for
such an approach, noting that "the Commission applauds industry self-regulation" and
suggesting that "any program of self-regulation is more effective when complemented by
strong enforcement mechanisms"). Similarly, Chairwoman Majoras echoed the point,
suggesting that "self-regulation by broadband providers could be an effective complement
to FTC enforcement of the consumer protection laws. I have commended self-regulation
efforts in many other industries and contexts and would encourage broadband providers to
also consider such a model." Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairwoman, FTC, Keynote Address
at the Federal Communications Bar Association Annual Meeting: The FTC: Working for
Consumers in the On-Line World 13 (June 27, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/070627fcba.pdf).
92. See Jeffrey S. Edelstein, Self-Regulation ofAdvertising: An Alternative to Litigation
and Government Action, 43 IDEA 509, 527 (2003) (explaining the regime and noting that
only 5% of cases are referred to the FTC and other government agencies); see also Andrew
Strenio et al., Self-Regulatory Techniques for Threading the Antitrust Needle, ANTITRUST
Summer 2004, 57, 57 (calling the National Advertising Division "a notable example of
successful self-regulation"). This regime calls for ultimate FTC oversight, which is
significant because self-regulatory regimes can be ineffective to the extent that there is no
credible threat of enforcement and that gaming will be punished to prevent firms from
misleading consumers to gain an advantage. See Posting of Bill Henderson to Empirical
Legal Studies Blog, USNVWR Gaming and the Failure of Self-Regulation, EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES BLOG, http://www.elsblog.org/the-empirical-legal-studi/2007/01/usnwr__gaming
_an.html (Jan. 25, 2007, 00:29 EST); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79
TEX. L. REV. 447 (2000) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999) and ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE
INTERNET IS PUTTING PEOPLE IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999) and
arguing, based on an Internet privacy case, that self-regulatory programs only work when
government oversight mechanisms are in place).
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Majoras highlighted with respect to Facebook's change of privacy policies,
listing complaints on web sites and calling attention to policies that are
either misleading or objectionable.93
Finally, to aid the FTC's effort in managing dispute resolution in this
context, I recommend that the Agency hire Internet technologists to support
its investigations and judgments in this area. After all, network
performance issues may well challenge the abilities of even the best
technology-minded lawyers. Moreover, bringing outside experts up-to-
speed on the relevant issues is often time consuming and expensive. As
Judge Posner put it, "cases in the new economy present unusually difficult
questions of fact because of the technical complexity of the products and
services produced by new-economy industries[,]" particularly because
"[c]omputer science and communications technology are much more
difficult areas than the average body of scientific or engineering knowledge
that lay judges and jurors are asked to absorb en route to rendering a
decision. '94
III. TOWARD A NEW COMPETITION POLICY STRATEGY
From a competition policy perspective, a core challenge of designing a
regulatory regime for addressing network neutrality concerns is to discern
what, if any, categorical rules should be developed and what legal
standards should regulate conduct based on particular factual contexts. The
effectiveness of a categorical rule-namely, one that requires all QoS
assurances to be offered on a nondiscriminatory basis-depends on (1) the
business environment in which the rule operates (i.e., how likely are
normal business arrangements to be procompetitive), (2) the ability to craft
a less restrictive and reasonably effective legal standard, and (3) the
effectiveness of the available institutional apparatus in terms of its ability to
superintend either a legal standard or a categorical rule. In the network
neutrality context, these three issues are often blurred together, making it
more difficult to tease out the appropriate resolution of this policy
challenge. This Part begins by discussing the business context for network
neutrality, then explains how it relates to the "bilateral monopoly" problem,
and concludes by discussing the case for using a legal standard (as opposed
to a categorical rule) as well as the effectiveness of the relevant
governmental institutions in managing such a regime.
93. A popular BitTorrent client (used for peer-to-peer file sharing), Azureus, has a wiki
that allows users to categorize their ISPs in terms of their policies on shaping peer-to-peer
traffic. See Bad ISPs, AZUREUSWIKI.COM, http://www.azureuswiki.com/index.php/BadISPs
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008).




A. The Past As Prologue?
In an important sense, the network neutrality debate merely replicates a
debate now over one hundred years old in the telecommunications industry
and in public utility regulation more generally. In particular, a provider of
basic infrastructure-a railroad or a telecommunications network-will
often seek some share of the available rents from the goods or services
carried on their platform. Without regulatory oversight, or countervailing
monopoly power on the part of the goods manufacturer (as Standard Oil
enjoyed as to oil), the railroad companies were renowned (and detested) for
charging supra-competitive prices that limited the potential profits available
to the farmers whose goods were shipped via their platform. 95 Similarly,
AT&T sought to entirely monopolize the provision of goods that worked in
conjunction with its network, famously opposing "foreign attachments" and
claiming for itself the sole right to charge (supra-competitive rents) for
applications like telephones that connected to the network. 96 In response to
both the abuses of monopoly power by the railroads and the Bell System,
calls for transparency and competition policy oversight prevailed on the
ground that society could not tolerate a state of affairs where "a monopoly
infrastructure business, in pursuit of its own ends, could take steps that
would ruin one business and make another succeed." 97
Over the history of telecommunications regulation, a basic equal access
(or nondiscriminatory interconnection) rule emerged as an essential
procompetitive safeguard enforced by regulators. 98 Initially, the courts did
not view interconnection between competitors (or complementors) 99 as a
95. See Joseph D. Keamey & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330-40 (1998) (examining the
changes over the last two decades in the structure of relationships between service providers
and consumers railroad regulation); see also JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY RATES 83 (1961) (discussing the existence of rate standards in the railway industry).
96. See Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (rejecting
an attempt by AT&T to invoke a tariff banning foreign attachments).
97. See Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the Never-Ending
Conflict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets 9 (Jan. 27, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1095350.
98. See Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 17 (2006) (arguing that "decades
of telecommunications experience" support the "one rule" proposal for a single anti-
discrimination rule). See generally Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1233 (2007) (emphasizing that an understanding of the distinction between interconnection
and nondiscrimination is critical for understanding the challenges of telecommunications
regulation).
99. The term "complementor" refers to the developer of an application that rides on a
platform. More generally, a complementor is a firm that develops a product where sales of
that product increases demand for (i.e., serves as a complement for) the primary product
(sometimes referred to as the "platform").
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concern of the traditional common carriage rule.100 Upon more reflection,
policymakers revised this rule and embraced a common carriage regime
that called for the regulation of interconnection arrangements.' 0 '
Moreover, in the antitrust context, the U.S. Department of Justice's 1974
lawsuit recommended, and the federal courts acquiesced, that antitrust
courts (at least with the aid of the FCC) could develop and enforce an
interconnection requirement.'0 2  Reflecting the hallowed status of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, all parties involved in the crafting and
administration of the Act conceded that interconnection between rival
networks was a principal goal of telecommunications policy. 0 3  This
consensus masked, however, that the enforcement of an interconnection
requirement raises challenging administrative questions, including what fee
a network required to terminate traffic that originates on a different
network can charge.'0 4 Nonetheless, on the level of principle, the right to
interconnect was viewed as absolute and parties were (and still are)
forbidden to use "refusals to exchange traffic" as a "bargaining tool," lest
callers not be "assured that their calls would go through."'
10 5
100. See, e.g., Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699, 703 (E.D. Wash. 1912)
(ruling that, under original common carriage rules, a co-carrier was not entitled to
interconnection); see also James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet
Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 258 (2002) (noting that the distinction between a
customer's access (which was governed by a common carriage requirement) and a
co-carrier's access reflected (1) where interconnection takes place, (2) whether it is
comparable to what the carrier gives itself, and (3) what price the carrier may charge);
Cellular Commc'ns Sys., Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz, Report and
Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 56 (1981) (noting that "[a] cellular system operator is a common
carrier and not merely a customer" and thus interconnection arrangements should be
designed "to minimize unnecessary duplication of switching facilities").
101. In particular, Congress instituted such a rule in the Communications Act of 1934.
See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
102. See, e.g., MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1101-03 (7th Cir. 1983)
(assigning liability based on AT&T's denial of interconnection to long distance
competitors); Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that
AT&T's predatory practices in relation to rivals in the equipment manufacturing market
gave rise to antitrust liability); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 224 (D.D.C. 1982)
(approving the break-up of AT&T and the imposition of equal access mandates to address
AT&T's discriminatory practices against long distance competitors and rival equipment
manufacturers), aft'd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
103. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2119-20 (1997) (calling for an interconnection
requirement on the ground that "the blockade position of the local monopolists is such that
they would have every incentive to guard access to their networks against their would-be
competitors").
104. The rates for compensation paid by the network originating the traffic to the
network that terminates the traffic are at the heart of the nettlesome policy issues that are
collectively termed "intercarrier compensation." These issues are discussed in
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 8, at 291-331.
105. Access Charge Reform, Reform of Access Charges Imposed by Competitive Local
Exchange Carriers, Seventh Report and Order and Further Notice of Rulemaking, 16




The rise of the Internet initially promised an environment where
regulation (including the imposition of interconnection mandates) would be
both unnecessary and ineffective along the lines that were largely
welcomed (and demanded) in telecommunications. 10 6 In particular, given
the presence of a multiplicity of ISPs in terms of basic access and a
competitive environment in the Internet backbone, the case for
interconnection regulation was initially rejected as unwise.10 7 By the turn
of the twenty-first century, however, it became increasingly clear that the
Internet would not escape regulatory oversight.
The initial skepticism that regulation of the Internet would be warranted
has given way to a number of Internet interconnection-related complaints.
First, the Department of Justice took an active stance in terms of merger
review to ensure that no Internet backbone provider built up a dominant
market share and could use its position to raise the costs of its rivals'
services. 0 8 Second, the FTC concluded, in reviewing a merger between
AOL and Time Warner, that the latter's control over cable broadband
services could be used to undermine competition in the traditional ISP
market and mandated that Time Warner provide a level of "open access" to
its broadband platform. 10 9 Finally, in that same merger, the FCC concluded
that AOL/Time Warner would possess a dominant position in the instant
messaging market and that, without an interoperability requirement, the
market would tip to a dominant firm (i.e., AOL/Time Warner). 110
106. See generally Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet (FCC,
Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), available at http:/www
.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp31.pdf (detailing the concerns about the
proper role of the FCC in the Internet age and the lessons the FCC has learned in the last
three decades).
107. See generally Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet
Backbones (FCC, Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 32, 2000), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working.papers/oppwp32.pdf (maintaining that the
current unregulated Internet backbone did not give rise to competition policy concerns and
that regulation was unnecessary).
108. In particular, the Justice Department mandated the divestiture of InternetMCI when
MCI merged with Worldcom (which owned UUNet). It also prevented MCIWorldcom
from merging with Sprint at least in part because the merger would bring together two
leading Internet backbone firms. For a discussion of the Department's rationale in these
cases, see Constance K. Robinson, Dir. of Operations and Merger Enforcement, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address Before the Practicing Law Institute: Network Effects in
Telecommunications Mergers (Aug. 23, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/3889.pdf.
109. See Am. Online, Inc., Decision and Order, FTC Docket No. C-3989 (Apr. 17,
2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/aoltwdo.pdf. For a critical evaluation
and discussion of the "open access" issue, see NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 8, at
159-68.
110. The FCC initially imposed an interoperability mandate, but lifted it two years later.
See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6604 (2001), available
at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Orders/2001/fccO012.pdf; Petition of AOL Time
Warner Inc. for Relief from the Condition Restricting Streaming Video AIHS,
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Critics of Internet regulation have hailed the Internet as different from
traditional telecommunications markets for technological, legal, and
economic reasons. On the technological front, some suggest that the
architecture of the Internet itself-which relies on an open set of protocols
(the TCP/IP protocol suite)-does not allow firms to engage in successful
anticompetitive discrimination. After all, because broadband Internet
access can support applications of all kinds, developers of new
technologies-ranging from the creators of instant messaging (e.g., ICQ)
to electronic commerce applications (e.g., eBay) to search (e.g.,
Google)-have been able to develop valuable applications without the need
to ask permission of network owners. In this sense, the Internet's technical
architecture is, as some have put it, "the telephone network turned inside
out." Consider, for example, that the management of Internet applications,
such as VolP, is maintained at the edges of the network whereas the
telephone network's applications, like caller ID, are managed by central
office switches. The difference in this architecture is very significant. For
example, the development and deployment of the system to enable 1-800
calls required considerable coordination with the incumbent telephone
companies; by contrast, the development and deployment of Skype's VoIP
technology required no cooperation from the network providers, relying
instead upon the decisions of millions of end-users to download and install
a software program.
The Internet's traditionally open architecture has enabled applications
developers to create new applications-including those that compete with
the broadband platform providers-without asking permission first. On
account of that architecture, the broadband providers have not enjoyed, at
least as compared to other platform providers, the same level of influence
over applications developers. 11' This architectural safeguard, however,
will not necessarily remain in place, and indeed, there are good reasons
(i.e., efficiencies and consumer benefits) for upgrading the Internet's
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,835, 16,835 (2003), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/aol-tw.html (follow "MO&O, Filed on Behalf of Cable
Service Bureau" hyperlink). For a critique of the FCC's decision, see Philip J. Weiser,
Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822 (2001).
111. See Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in
Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 1 (2007),
available at http://www.Platfornleadership.com/Gawer/o20HendersonOJEMS%202007.pdf
(noting that, in platform markets, platform providers "may have considerable influence over
the livelihood of developers of complementary products, and the behavior of platform
owners toward the other firms in the ecosystem has been subject to much scrutiny");
see also Annabelle Gawer & Michael A. Cusumano, Strategies for Being a Platform
Leader, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2007, at R6 (emphasizing that a platform sponsor "must create
economic incentives that encourage other firms to develop complementary applications for
the platform, and at the same time protect its own ability to profit from its innovations").
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architecture. Some of these improvements, moreover, will create the
possibility of discrimination by broadband providers," 12 meaning that
regulators cannot rely on the Internet's historic architecture as a continuing
safeguard against possible anticompetitive conduct.
For legal reasons, the Internet is different from traditional
telecommunications networks. To begin with, Interet-related services did
not emerge from a regulated monopoly environment and Congress
pronounced in the 1996 Act that it was the policy of the United States "to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal
or State regulation .... ,"' '3 Invoking this objective, the FCC has classified
broadband Internet access as an "information service," rejecting the
possibility that the transmission of Internet traffic could qualify as a
"telecommunications service."11 4 By so doing, as I discussed above, the
FCC suggested-but did not require-a rule of forbearance from traditional
regulation.
Finally, the Internet differs from traditional telecommunications on
economic grounds. During the modem history of telecommunications
regulation, the conduct of AT&T's Bell System attracted regulatory scrutiny
and gave rise to the modem consensus that interconnection regulation
constitutes an essential regulatory safeguard. In particular, AT&T abused
its monopoly platform to extract rents from applications providers as well as
its competitors. Because such applications providers (and competitors)
offered socially valuable services, policyrnakers were unwilling to allow the
whim and caprice of AT&T to limit or prevent their availability. In the case
of the Internet, however, the gatekeepers-i.e., broadband Internet
providers-face far more competition than the Bell System ever did and are
not subject to price regulation (which gave rise to the Bell System's
powerful incentive to discriminate against applications providers). The
critical question for policymakers thus becomes whether these differences
require a new regulatory strategy and, if so, what should that strategy look
like.
112. The perspective that the Internet's architecture is both important and subject to
change owes a great debt to Lawrence Lessig. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 25 (1999).
113. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000).
114. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986
(2005) (upholding classification of cable modem service as an "information service").
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B. The Terminating Access Monopoly and the Bilateral Monopoly Problem
In its report on the state of broadband competition, the FTC staff focused
on a particular aspect of the business relationships in the
telecommunications industry. In particular, the report focused on the
economic phenomenon known as the "terminating access monopoly"
problem.1 15 This problem emerges when a single firm controls termination
fees and those fees are not necessarily transparent to a customer. In
telephony, even in a competitive market, firms are tempted to raise
termination fees, expecting that the firm which charges the customer
directly will be the one blamed for the higher price." 6 Such higher prices,
to the extent that regulation allows them, harm society insofar as they
distort the demand for the product."17 For the firm with the terminating
access monopoly, however, the imposition of those charges is often a
rational business strategy aimed at maximizing its short term economic
rents. After all, when A calls B on her cell phone, the firm providing
service to B enjoys a de facto monopoly over service to B and thus can-and
often will-charge supra-competitive prices for terminating the call (unless
regulations restrict the allowable price for termination).
As suggested by the FTC, a critical competition policy issue at the heart
of the network neutrality debate is the concern that broadband operators
will act opportunistically and seek to levy supra-competitive charges to
applications providers after they establish the demand for their product.
Notably, with respect to the provision of guaranteed QoS assurances, such
assurances could be used to impose a de facto terminating access fee that
will have deleterious effects in terms of distorting demand for broadband-
intensive products and services as well as undermining the incentive to
develop such products in the first place. In his concurrent statement to the
FTC Staff Report, Commissioner Jonathan Leibowitz expressed this very
concern, noting that the dangers (albeit "uncertain" ones) from the
terminating access monopoly problem include:
increased prices being charged by Internet content and applications
providers to consumers (to cover those providers' new costs of paying
for access to those same customers) and a reduction in the long run
115. See BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, supra note 3, at 77-79 (detailing the terminating
access monopoly issue and the ensuing harms).
116. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 8, at 291-331 (proposing alternate policy
approaches to the terminating access monopoly issue).
117. See BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, supra note 3, at 77-78 (noting how large access
payments for cell phone calls in Europe give rise to significantly lower usage rates than in
the United States).
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incentives for those application and content providers to develop new
products, as the broadband firms would be able to expropriate the value
of those new products.
118
Viewed in context, the terminating access monopoly problem is related
to the "bilateral monopoly" phenomenon. In short, the challenge of
bilateral monopoly relationships is that two firms are forced to cooperate
with one another and must confront the temptations to undermine the
success of the other for its own proprietary advantage." 9 On one hand,
both firms may appreciate that an overly aggressive posture toward the
other-the imposition of significant access fees, for example-will be
harmful to society overall and may well leave them worse off in the long
run. On the other hand, firms are notoriously uncomfortable participating
in a bilateral monopoly relationship where their partner (which depends on
their cooperation to remain in business) succeeds economically while they
do not. In the network neutrality context, this latter concern has even
developed a name and a face: "Google envy," reflecting the frustration of
broadband providers that Google receives the adulation of users and Wall
Street, while they are viewed as providing a commodity service of limited
value. 1
20
The ideal management solution to the bilateral monopoly problem (and,
for that matter, the terminating access monopoly issue) may well be for the
affected firms to agree to a program of self-regulation that ensures some
level of transparency and stability. In other sectors of the economy,
platform providers sometimes develop mechanisms for doing so,
recognizing the need to invite entry and innovation by outside applications
developers. 121  Consider, for example, that Intel has developed "three
118. Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, FCC, Concurring Statement Regarding the Staff Report:
"Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy" (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/speeches/leibowitzV070000statement.pdf.
119. Thus, in theory, it is not merely the broadband provider but also the applications
developer which can engage in strategic behavior. Consider, for example, that Google could
decide to boycott a particular broadband provider in order to hold up that provider for either
a payment or, as the case might be, an absence of a payment that is otherwise warranted to
offset infrastructure development costs. After all, consumer demand for applications and
content are critical drivers of demand for broadband in the first place, and most broadband
users would be deeply disturbed if Google were unavailable to them.
120. As technology commentator Om Malik explains, "Google envy is a generic term I
use when referring to companies that are jealous of profits made by online advertising
players such as Yahoo and Google." Posting of Om Malik to GigaOM, Comcast Wants to
Be Yahoo, GIGAOM, available at http://gigaom.com/2006/08/15/comcast-wants-to-be-
yahoo (Aug. 15, 2006, 23:09 EST).
121. In particular, platform firms often develop contractual or structural arrangements to
assure complementors (i.e., applications developers) that they will not engage in strategic
behavior to maximize their profits by charging later-imposed fees or other "hold-up" tactics
taken after the complementor develops a new product. For such, this sort of behavior is
called "ex post opportunism." There is a significant literature discussing the phenomenon
and noting measures that can prevent it from taking place. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson,
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primary [structural] mechanisms to signal that it will not engage in any ex
post 'squeezing' of [applications] entrants."'1 2  Microsoft, by contrast, not
only failed to institute such protections, but was found, in the Justice
Department's antitrust suit against it, to have engaged in after-the-fact
strategic behavior designed to undermine certain applications developers.
123
Consequently, the antitrust court imposed a consent decree that provided a
level of oversight of Microsoft's management of its platform in an attempt
to assure developers' freedom from opportunistic behavior. 24 In theory,
this consent decree-like Intel's structural strategies-provides a credible
commitment against strategic behavior going forward and, in a suggestion
that Microsoft appreciates the virtue of such a commitment, the company
has committed to follow the terms of the decree even after the district court
no longer enforces it.
125
If the past is prologue, broadband providers will be unable or unwilling
to institute safeguards that will assure applications developers freedom to
innovate and protection from ex post opportunism. Moreover,
telecommunications regulators are likely to be sensitive to this possibility
and on the lookout for strategic behavior whereby broadband providers
engage in hold-up strategies-e.g., refusals to provide a level of quality
assurance without a supra-competitive fee. Notably, not only have such
regimes developed in the telephony context (as discussed above), but such
regulations have emerged in the television context as well, where cable
television providers must follow specific procedures before removing
programming originating from TV broadcasters. In particular, such
regulations guard against the possibility that a cable company might pull
the plug on a broadcast network (say, ABC) when its customers are
awaiting its "must see" programming (as "Who Wants to Be A
Millionaire?" once was). 1
26
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
519-20 (1983).
122. Gawer & Henderson, supra note 111, at 3.
123. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (detailing
the factual basis for the case).
124. The effectiveness of that decree is open to question, highlighted by the fact that the
district court extended it on the grounds that Microsoft had moved "too slowly in delivering
technical documentation to rivals licensing its Windows communication protocols." See
Anne Broache, Judge Adds Two Years to Microsoft Antitrust Deal, CNET NEWS.COM, May
17, 2006, http://news.com.com/2102-1012_3-6073250.html.
125. Benjamin J. Romano, DOJ Says Microsoft Antitrust Settlement a Success;
California, Other States Disagree, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, available at
http:/fblog.seattletimes.nwsource.com/techtracks/archives/2007/08/doj-says-microsoft-antit
rust_settlement a success.html (describing some of the controversy surrounding the
Microsoft settlements and its fallout).
126. The posited scenario is, of course, not a hypothetical scenario as it reflects the facts
of a case decided by the FCC in 2000 when it ruled that Time Warner could not terminate its
carriage of ABC on its cable systems during the local station audience rating period
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Leading industry players have an opportunity-before the development
of a public regulatory regime-to work together and with impacted
stakeholders to develop private institutions to ensure that Internet
interconnection-type issues are managed in a predictable and fair manner.
As noted above, some businesses like Intel have developed mechanisms to
prevent ex post opportunistic behavior (also called "strategic behavior")
from undermining cooperative relationships. Given that the Internet's
traditional architecture prevented such behavior, its evolution may well
tempt broadband providers to test hold-up strategies and the like, making
them reluctant to voluntarily commit to mechanisms designed to punish
such behavior. From a policy standpoint, however, the prospect of deterred
innovation in Internet-related markets on account of ex post strategic
behavior presents a serious concern. 127  Consequently, as with the
telephony and railroad examples noted above, it is quite likely that public
regulation (including antitrust) will emerge as the principal check on such
conduct. 28 The next Section moves on to the question of what an optimal
oversight regime would look like.
C. Categorical Rules Versus Legal Standards
As noted above, there is a real possibility that broadband providers and
applications developers will be unable to agree on a framework for
business relationships that both will deem satisfactory. Given that
possibility, policymakers will need to develop a strategy for preventing
anticompetitive behavior. At a broad level, policymakers can select one of
two options: the institution of a categorical rule that imposes a set of
prophylactic requirements that restrict the terms of dealing on the front end,
or an after-the-fact evaluatory mechanism that scrutinizes the terms of
dealing entered into by the parties, leading to possible remedial steps on the
back end. This Section will discuss each in turn.
("sweeps period") even though ABC's contract had expired. Time Warner Cable,
Emergency Petition of ABC, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 7882,
7886 (2000).
127. More generally, as Gawer and Henderson note, "if the entrant monopolist's
incentive to engage in ex post price 'squeezes' is sufficiently strong, complementors may
have no ex ante incentive to engage in innovation at all." Gawer & Henderson, supra note
111, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
128. Andrew Odlyzko arrives at a similar conclusion, suggesting that:
[S]ome form of government intervention, to set the rules, is inevitable. (And at
some point it may be welcomed by the players, just as government intervention was
welcomed in the end by the railroads.) Society needs basic rules to operate by, and
modem technology creates potential scenarios that old rules did not cover. But we
need to remember that it is not easy to regulate markets, especially ones in
cyberspace, and especially when policy makers labor under the burden of many
false myths.
Odlykzo, supra note 97, at 12.
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1. The Call of the Categorical Rule
For most of the FCC's history, the agency has relied on categorical rules
to bar vertical integration. With regard to the entry of telecommunications
firms into the data processing sector, for example, the FCC's Computer
Inquiry rules initially barred such vertical integration on the ground that
transport providers could not be trusted to provide information services
(then called "enhanced services") without discriminating against their
rivals in that market. 129 This policy rested on what Joe Farrell and I call
"Baxter's Law." 130  In particular, as then-Assistant Attorney General
William Baxter highlighted during the AT&T antitrust litigation, a platform
monopoly subject to price regulation has a powerful incentive to control the
applications market in an effort to recoup monopoly rents denied to it by
price regulation of the platform. Later, however, the FCC reevaluated the
merits of this quarantine solution, concluding this strong medicine had the
unfortunate side effect of preventing certain services (notably, voicemail)
from reaching the market. Stated more broadly, the FCC revised its policy
(from the so-called Computer I decision) to be more tolerant of vertical
integration on the ground that it not only gives rise to competitive risks, but
also creates consumer benefits (including enabling voicemail to be
provided economically). In light of this conclusion, the Computer II
decision loosened the restrictions imposed on the telecommunications
providers, requiring only that they provide "equal access" to their
telecommunications service.
13 '
The network neutrality debate essentially asks what version, if any, of
the Computer Inquiry rules are warranted for a broadband era. As a formal
matter, the FCC coupled its decisions classifying broadband as information
services (as opposed to telecommunications services) with the judgment
that the Computer II equal access rules should not be applied to broadband
services. 132 The FCC kept its options open, however, noting that it could
reverse this decision and is considering this possibility in the now-pending
Notice of Inquiry.' 33 If the FCC were to reverse that decision, it could
129. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 129 (describing concerns that include cross-
subsidization, improper pricing of common carrier services, as well as related
anticompetitive practices and activities).
130. Id. at 94 n.40, 105-07.
131. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Report
and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, 7442 (2001) (mandating that providers must apply the same
prices, terms, and conditions).
132. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet, Declaratory Ruling and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4825 (2002), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-02-77AI.pdf (detailing the underlying
reasons behind the decision).
133. See Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894, 7894
(2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-07-3 1Al.pdf
(seeking examples of "beneficial or harmful behavior").
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impose a categorical rule requiring-as the Computer II decision did-that
broadband platform providers make available any enhanced transport
services, such as QoS assurances, to all comers at nondiscriminatory terms
and conditions. Conceivably, the FCC could also categorically ban all
enhanced transport services, but such a ban seems unlikely, because it rests
more on a vision of an egalitarian Internet than on advancing competition
policy goals.
134
At a basic level, the argument for using categorical and prophylactic
rules to address network neutrality concerns is that the Internet's openness
to innovation without permission must be maintained at all costs. Over the
last several years, parties have coalesced around the recognition that a
categorical rule against the blocking or degrading of Internet content or
services is warranted. In 2005, FCC Chairman Michael Powell addressed
this issue in delineating his concept of "Internet Freedom," which called on
all providers to allow access to applications and devices that did not harm
the network. 35 Subsequently, the FCC adopted a slightly revised version
of these freedoms in an Internet Policy Statement. 36 Moreover, in the one
instance that clearly raised this issue, the FCC acted quickly to ban the
blocking of Vonage's VolP service by Madison River Communications,
37
underscoring the certainty that can come from a categorical rule.
138
134. To offer a rough analogy, banning the offering of QoS guarantees for a fee would
be akin to a ban on the post office's delivery of priority basis mail. Under such a ban,
customers would be worse off insofar as all mail would only be delivered on a first class
basis--or possibly on an improved basis that would cost more than today's first class mail.
Indeed, some commentators analogize best efforts service to first class mail and QoS
assurances (e.g., guaranteed delivery, no traffic loss, and delivery confirmation) to priority
delivery. SeungJae Shin et al., A Progressive Analysis of Internet Market: From Best Effort
to Quality of Service, 28 TELECOMM. POL'Y 363, 364 (2004). As for the argument that such
a ban is consistent with an egalitarian vision of the Internet, that perspective fails to account
for the economic inefficiency that such a ban would entail, as well as the reality that the
Internet is already not an egalitarian medium (thanks to the availability of SLAs and caching
services for those firms that can afford them).
135. See Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the
Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (2004) (describing "Internet
Freedom" as freedom to access content, use applications, attach personal devices, and obtain
service plain information).
136. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988 (2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-151Al.pdf [hereinafter Internet
Policy Statement] (listing the newly adopted principles to ensure accessibility of broadband
networks).
137. See Madison River Communications, LLC, Consent Decree, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295,
4297 (2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-05-
543A2.pdf (providing that Madison River must neither block ports nor otherwise hinder
customers from using VoIP).
138. More recently, the FCC again enforced the no blocking rule in the context of
allegations that certain carriers were blocking telephone calls to a rural carrier believed to be
participating in a "traffic dumping scheme." See Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for
Local Exchange Carriers, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 11,629 (2007),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-07-2863A 1 .pdf.
[60:2
THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR NETWORK NEUTRALITY
2. The Possible Precision of a Legal Standard
Whereas the virtue of a categorical rule against selective "access tiering"
would provide a level of transparency and certainty, a legal standard
promises to allow a greater degree of experimentation and the opportunity
to evaluate evidence of competitive impact before condemning a restricted
enhanced services offering. To be sure, a legal standard can and should be
designed to expedite the resolution of complaints of anticompetitive
conduct, and as I have argued elsewhere, it is reasonable to view
discriminatory offerings of QoS assurances as suspect and presumptively
unlawful. 139 But suspicion (and even skepticism) of restrictive offerings
does not preclude analysis of plausible efficiency justifications.
Under an after-the-fact evaluation of discriminatory enhanced services
offerings, the burden would be on the platform provider to justify the
restricted offering as procompetitive. Such a burden would require the
provider to explain, for example, how the restriction facilitated pro-
consumer price discrimination (i.e., to facilitate network investment and
innovation) as opposed to, for example, protecting legacy revenues from
competition. On balance, I favor this regime over a front-end rule because
I believe that (1) there are likely to be legitimate reasons for offering
preferential treatment in some cases (meaning that a rule banning such
treatment would undermine procompetitive efficiencies); (2) there are
effective enforcement strategies for policing the duty to provide reasonable
access to QoS assurances; and (3) the continuing provision of best efforts
broadband access will provide a safeguard by ensuring some opportunity
for outside innovators to deploy new applications. I discuss each point in
turn.
a. The Possible Legitimate Justifications for Exclusive Arrangements
The competitive impact of the array of possible business relationships
between broadband operators and applications providers is just beginning
to become clear, and policymakers have a considerable amount to learn on
this score. The ambiguous nature of the competitive effects that emerge
from the business relationships at issue cautions against a categorical rule
(as opposed to an after-the-fact evaluation based on a legal standard).
140
139. In particular, I outlined this model in Weiser, Toward a Next Generation, supra
note 8, at 75-85.
140. Chairwoman Majoras made the point this way:
All of these types of conduct-integration, prioritization, refusals to deal, and
so forth-can be anticompetitive and harmful to consumers under certain
conditions. What is often missed in the debate, however, is that they also can be
procompetitive-capable of improving efficiency and consumer welfare, which
involves, among other things, the prices that consumers pay, the quality of goods
and services offered, and the choices that are available in the marketplace. An
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Moreover, as a historical matter, public policy efforts-such as the
financial interest and syndication rules-that restricted the ability of firms
to integrate into the applications market have not fared well in terms of
protecting consumers,141 both because of unintended consequences that
emerged from a prescriptive legal regime1 42 as well as the foreclosed entry
by the platform provider. 143 Finally, as Gawer and Henderson observe, not
only are the competitive effects of the relationship between platforms and
applications uncertain, but economic analysis and empirical investigations
into the behavior of platform providers are still in fairly primitive
condition; thus, categorical pronouncements are difficult to make. 1
44
If there were no legitimate reasons for discrimination between
applications providers, it would be foolhardy to set up a regime that would
call for an inquiry into whether any such discrimination were justifiable.
There are, however, reasons to believe that firms may only be able to
choose one preferred provider in a particular context either for legitimate
marketing or technical reasons. For example, TiVo struck a deal with
DirecTV under which DirecTV marketed solely the TiVo service to its
customers. In that deal, DirecTV paid TiVo a lower price per subscriber
than Tivo charged its retail customers, but DirecTV also encouraged its
customers to use TiVo, thereby ensuring a higher quantity of sales and
antitrust inquiry permits a determination of the net effects on consumer welfare
before conduct is summarily condemned.
Majoras, supra note 91, at 12.
141. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 112 (discussing nature of "finsyn" rules and
their reform).
142. See Majoras, supra note 91, at 14 ("Despite the good intentions of their proponents,
industry-wide regulatory schemes-particularly those imposing general, one-size-fits-all
restraints on business conduct-may well have adverse effects on consumer welfare, as
certain unintended consequences may not be known until far into the future.").
143. See Gawer & Henderson, supra note 111, at 26 (explaining, based on their study of
Intel's behavior, that "foreclosing entry by third parties to the system almost certainly
reduces consumer welfare," but, at same time, it is important not to preclude entry by
platform providers as allowing "some entry by [platform] monopolists is almost certainly
beneficial"). As Shane Greenstein put it, "[n]o market participant knows the best option for
creating and delivering economic value, so it is in society's interest to have both broadband
carriers and others conduct directed economic experiments" in terms of what applications
should be developed. Shane Greenstein, Economic Experiments and Neutrality in Internet
Access 42 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,158, 2007), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3158. In short, the emphasis on allowing platform provider
entry into applications markets follows from the ICE principle that explains how platform
providers have a vested interest in the development of valuable applications and why, absent
any exceptions to the principle, the decision by a platform provider to integrate into the
applications market is likely to reflect the desire of a platform provider to encourage the
development of new applications. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 100-05.
144. See Gawer & Henderson, supra note I 1, at 2 (noting the "very scant empirical
work in the area" and even a relatively minimal theoretical investigation of the complex set
of incentives that bear upon the conduct of platform providers).
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ultimately facilitating two-thirds of TiVo's consumer adoptions.145 One
could easily imagine that a similar deal between TiVo and a cable operator
might well involve the commitment of a level of QoS for a TiVo offering, a
discount for that offering to cable customers, and cable company promotion
of that product. Were such an offering not made available to one of TiVo's
competitors, however, this type of arrangement would be banned under a
categorical rule against access tiering.
The most difficult cases for evaluating the legitimacy of discriminatory
arrangements are where the platform provider claims that the arrangement
is necessary to facilitate price discrimination. Many forms of price
discrimination-those practiced by the airlines and movie theatres, for
example-provide efficient forms of recovering front-end investments.
Indeed, such practices may well become the norm in competitive industries
searching for the most efficient means of recovering sunk investments-
contrary to earlier conclusions that price discrimination reflected the
presence of monopoly power. 146  Other forms of price discrimination,
however, can be used to exercise market power or may be inefficient
insofar as they create "collateral damage."' 147  Notably, the collateral
damage concern does not rest on whether the actual price discrimination
arrangement increases overall output, but rather whether the arrangement is
plainly inefficient. Thus, for example, the reasonableness of the European
carriers' decision to limit the functionality of phones sold to customers to
prevent them from using VoIP would need to be analyzed through the lens
of whether the price discrimination benefits justified the associated
collateral damage necessary to make the strategy effective.
148
Regulators face a formidable challenge in assessing what price
discrimination arrangements are justifiable. 149  As a starting point, it is
145. Marco lansiti & Greg Richards, Creative Construction: Assimilation,
Specialization, and the Technology Life Cycle (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 21,
available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/events/innovationforum/papers/iansiti.pdf).
146. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, REGULATION MISLED BY MISREAD THEORY 6 (2006),
available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/
php3x.pdf (noting that highly competitive markets can result in discriminatory pricing as a
superior strategy for recovering costs, but that such discrimination does not signify market
power sufficient to trigger antitrust issues).
147. Farrell, supra note 45, at 199-200.
148. As a newspaper account noted, this decision can be viewed both as a "desperate
move" to "defend their voice revenue" as well as an attempt to protect their ability to
subsidize the handsets through a predictable stream of voice revenue. Bill Ray, Orange and
Vodafone Cripple Nokia's Flagship, THE REGISTER, Apr. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/04/18/n95 crippled/print.html.
149. A considerable reason for this difficulty is that the state of economic learning on
price discrimination arrangements in practice is still evolving. As former FTC Chairman
Tim Muris put it, "more research is needed concerning how to identify price discrimination
that raises competitive concerns." Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Remarks at the
George Mason University Law Review's Winter Antitrust Symposium: Improving the
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critical that regulators not condemn all forms of price discrimination, but
endeavor to identify and leave intact ones that present relatively minimal
collateral damage-such as a Saturday night stay requirement in airline
pricing.150 To that end, Howard Shelanski has developed a taxonomy of
different forms of price discrimination, noting that ones without any
targeted application, such as a QoS assurance available to all, are
presumptively legitimate whereas targeted price discrimination levied in
the absence of any capacity constraint is presumptively illegitimate. 151 To
ensure that such decisions can be made quickly and effectively, regulators
will almost certainly need to adopt some such framework, and by so doing
will provide valuable guidance to the industry. Admittedly, any such
framework will be prone to some errors, but by necessity, any legal system
cannot and should not seek to replicate exactly the judgments of economic
analysis.
152
In cases where a platform provider cannot justify an exclusionary
agreement through its facilitation of a new product, its protection of the
provider's customers, its giving rise to procompetitive price discrimination,
or some other legitimate business reason, it is critical that regulation protect
the ability of potentially excluded applications providers to develop new
products. Notably, disruptive technologies (i.e., services that threaten to
undermine legacy revenue opportunities for the platform providers) face a
real risk that platform providers will seek to prevent the emergence of such
products. 53  Consider, for example, that the major U.S. firms resisted
allowing Virgin Mobile's Mobile Virtual Network Operator to develop its
service. Even when Virgin Mobile did develop an agreement to launch its
service from Sprint's network, it had to concede that it would only "market
Foundations of Competition Policy (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/muris/improveconfoundatio.htm.
150. As Andrew Odlyzko points out, even the old common carrier rules did not bar all
forms of price discrimination, allowing, for example, "reasonable discrimination," such as
student or senior citizen discounts. Odlyzko, supra note 97, at 8.
151. Howard A. Shelanski, Network Neutrality: Regulating with More Questions than
Answers, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 34 (2007).
152. As Justice Breyer recently explained:
[L]aw, unlike economics, is an administrative system the effects of which depend
upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges and
juries in courts and by lawyers advising their clients. And that fact means that
courts will often bring their own administrative judgment to bear, sometimes
applying rules of per se unlawfulness to business practices even when those
practices sometimes produce benefits.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2729 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
153. As Shane Greenstein explained, "Particularly worrisome are situations where
carriers take actions that are privately beneficial-either to protect existing markets or
related commercial investments and relationships-and have the consequence of reducing
the incentives of other firms to conduct economic experiments that could create value."
Greenstein, supra note 143, at 40.
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a prepaid product that would not directly compete with Sprint's products
nor compete for Sprint's mainstream customers." 154  Similarly, only
T-Mobile was willing to support the Handspring Treo when it first came on
the market and T-Mobile remains the only firm supporting a dual-mode
cellular/wi-fi phone.1
55
The stories of the Virgin Mobile, Handspring, and cellular/wi-fi phones
underscore two related points. The first lesson is that established
incumbents are likely to protect legacy revenues first and worry about
innovation later when faced with the advent of disruptive technologies.1
56
The second lesson is that if there are sufficient rival platforms-and the
presence of four alternative ones in the wireless context provides markedly
more competition than is present in broadband markets-the opportunity to
play carriers against one another makes it more likely that application
developers can overcome this hurdle. 57 Indeed, in the face of competition
in the wireless market-including the threat of Google's entry into that
market-Verizon took the notable step of promising to open its platform to
applications by third party developers. 15 8 Consequently, network neutrality
154. The 700 Mhz Auction: Public Safety and Competition: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 110th Cong. 9 (2007) (written statement of
Amol R. Sarva, Wireless Founders Coalition for Innovation), available at http://commerce
.senate.gov/publicLfiles/TestimonyArolSarva_SarvaWrittenStatement0.pdf.
155. Teresa von Fuchs, T-Mobile Launches Wi-Fi Phone Service, WIRELESSWEEK, June
27, 2007, http://www.wirelessweek.com/article.aspx?id=149816.
156. The focus on legacy revenues, as Clayton Christensen has explained, underscores
why outside upstarts and not incumbent providers develop many significant innovations-
such as modems, answering machines and speakerphones in telecommunications. CLAYTON
M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA 61 (1997).
157. In the wireless context, the introduction of the iPhone underscored both (1) the
potential for outside innovators to find a platform and thereby disrupt traditional business
models, as well as (2) the resistance, even in a relatively competitive market, of incumbent
providers to allowing truly disruptive applications. As one technology commentator noted:
How much and [how] quickly incumbent networks operators will be willing to
give up the assurance of revenues derived from captive control of cellphone
services versus how much they can capitalize on the popularity of new services is
galvanized by [the] conclusion that a shift to open IP environment is inevitable. If
incumbent operators strongly resist the shift [to open development using Internet
technology], independent operators will have a more open field to exploit the pent-
up interest of consumers as demonstrated by the iPhone.
What is most compelling about [the] iPhone is that this is simply an opening
volley which signals ability for outside players to bring compelling products to
market that take advantage of PC and Internet developments.
Robert Syputa, Clash of the Titans: What Is Really Different About the Apple iPhone,
MARAVEDIS, http://www.maravedis-bwa.com/article-6.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
158. See Sascha Segan, Verizon's Open Network Has Eyes on the Future, PC
MAGAZINE.COM, Nov. 27, 2007, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2704,2222863,00.asp
(concluding that Verizon's announcement reflects the reality in the wireless arena that the
industry is moving "inexorably towards a world where 'cell phone' is a feature, not a
product, and cellular networks are ISPs, not all-controlling masters of your wireless
destiny").
2008]
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
in the wired broadband arena could fade as a competition policy issue if
sufficient rivalry in broadband platforms were to emerge. Unless it does,
regulatory oversight may well be necessary to protect innovators against
actions by network owners to prevent disruptive technologies from
reaching the market.
b. The Presence of Effective Enforcement Mechanisms
After all is said and done regarding network neutrality, the most
nettlesome policy challenge is to develop and implement an effective
institutional framework to enforce any system of managing the competition
policy issues associated with overseeing the terms of dealing between
applications providers and network owners. Indeed, even some network
neutrality proponents may agree that when viewed in isolation, the choice
between a categorical rule and a legal standard may well militate in favor
of a legal standard. But once the institutional actor charged with enforcing
that standard is introduced, that actor's institutional capabilities become a
relevant consideration and can tip the balance.
As commentators increasingly emphasize, the future of
telecommunications regulation is for the FCC to reorient its mission to
evaluating conduct after the fact using antitrust-like standards.1 59 There
will always be a need for clear rules where the competitive impact of
particular conduct is clear, but for a wide array of cases, the ability to
evaluate and sanction conduct after the fact will provide an effective
regulatory strategy. Unfortunately, the FCC has yet to develop this
capability. Rather, the FCC continues to operate based on a culture that
addresses issues more on a legislative-like basis, with a limited track record
in handling adjudications and expedited proceedings under a rule-of-law
model. Thus, for the FCC to be authorized to adjudicate network
neutrality-type disputes, it must develop new enforcement capabilities.
One possible means of lowering the stakes of the FCC's effectiveness in
managing after-the-fact oversight is to use antitrust law as a source of
parallel enforcement if the FCC's enforcement agenda is ineffectual or
nonexistent. After all, antitrust courts, and not the FCC, policed AT&T's
conduct and sanctioned the company for using "inappropriate or inefficient
equipment or procedures" to interconnect with MCI. 160 More generally,
antitrust courts have used an inquiry not unlike that specified above to
159. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 8, at 428-29 (suggesting that the FCC's
role be limited to remedying anticompetitive conduct rather than taking proactive
initiatives); see also Shelanski, supra note 32, at 101-02 (recommending an "ex post
enforcement regime" because some conduct may have a beneficial effect on consumers).
160. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1150 (7th Cir. 1983).
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condemn conduct designed to raise rivals' costs. 161  The jurisdiction of
antitrust courts to evaluate such complaints, however, is open to question in
light of Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP;
in that case, the Supreme Court suggested that the "additional benefit to
competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small" where
a regulatory structure is "designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive
harm."'162  This raises the question of whether the FCC's oversight of
broadband markets will be deemed sufficient to preclude antitrust
oversight.
In evaluating the role of antitrust law in addressing network neutrality
concems, the FTC's Staff Report took a fairly optimistic stance on this
score, reading the Trinko decision-and the institutional competence
concerns that animated it-as imposing few relevant limits on the role of
antitrust law. 163  In so doing, the Report followed the precedent of the
Antitrust Modernization Commission's report, which declined to read
Trinko as imposing a separation of powers-like limitation on antitrust
courts (i.e., deferring to regulatory agencies where they possess jurisdiction
to oversee competition policy concems).164 As a substantive matter, I agree
that the mere presence of regulatory jurisdiction-without active and
effective oversight-should not suffice to displace antitrust oversight.
65
Whether the Supreme Court will adopt this reading of Trinko or a broader
one that precludes antitrust enforcement when a regulatory body possesses
jurisdiction remains to be seen.
166
161. See, e.g., Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal
& Prof I Publ'ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1553 n.12 (10th Cir. 1995) (condemning conduct that
raises rivals' costs without the demonstration of "a legitimate business justification" for the
conduct in question as anticompetitive).
162. 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
163. FTC Chairwoman Majoras made the case for the effectiveness of antitrust law as
"well-equipped to deal with the competitive issues raised in the net neutrality debate."
Majoras, supra note 91, at 11. In particular, she suggested that "[t]hese competitive issues
are not new to antitrust law, which is general, flexible, and able to analyze potential conduct
and business arrangements involving broadband Internet access, just as it has been able to
deal with such conduct and arrangements across many diverse markets." Id. Commissioner
Jon Leibowitz, by contrast, suggested that "while antitrust may be a good way of thinking
about [consumers' 'Internet Freedoms'], it is not necessarily well-suited to protecting
them." Leibowitz, supra note 118, at 1. In particular, he noted that "there is little agreement
over whether antitrust, with its requirements for ex post case by case analysis, is capable of
fully and in a timely fashion resolving many of the concerns that have animated the net
neutrality debate." Id. at 3.
164. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS 22,
340, 360 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/
toc.htm (deeming Trinko merely a refusal-to-deal case that "does not displace the role of
antitrust laws in regulated industries").
165. See Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a
Deregulatory Era, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549, 587 (2005) (concluding that regulatory
regimes have limitations that necessitate judicial oversight under antitrust law).
166. See Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality
Debate?, 1 INT'L J. CoMM. 493, 528 (2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/
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In short, the most important issue related to network neutrality may well
be the one discussed least: what institutional strategy can best enforce
whatever rules are put in place? Notably, even a prophylactic rule will
undoubtedly raise some definitional issues or allow for exceptions,
meaning that the institutional capabilities of the body charged with
enforcing it will influence greatly its success or failure. To date, the FCC
has resolved policy questions largely through the political processes of
lobbying and negotiation, rarely relying on the adjudication of contested
proceedings. Consequently, one high stakes policy question is whether the
FCC's institutional culture is amenable to change or whether the
management of network neutrality issues should be entrusted to a different
agency, such as the FTC. This issue is particularly important because
Trinko might preclude antitrust law from playing a supportive role to
regulation, thereby removing a possible safety net if that regulation is
unable to function effectively.
c. The Value of Continuing Best Efforts Internet Access
Even in the midst of enhanced offerings (such as ones that assure a level
of service quality), new innovators can still deploy applications using the
best efforts network-provided such a network continues to exist at
evolving levels. Consequently, one important insurance policy is the
strategy outlined above-that the marketing of broadband Internet access
must provide a reasonable level of best efforts access, along with the
additional bandwidth devoted to QoS assurances. As Blair Levin has
stated, "Without some basic guarantee of an improving, not degrading,
open lane, investors in Internet applications would be less willing to invest
in new applications. 167  In short, the availability of such best efforts
Internet connectivity can ensure both that innovators can deploy new
applications and that, once successful, those applications are not subject to
papers/163/ ("It is too early to determine which of these various readings of Trinko will
ultimately prevail and whether the level of oversight undertaken by the FCC is sufficient to
forestall antitrust enforcement."). In its recent decision in Credit Suisse Securities (USA)
LLC v. Billing, however, the Court suggested that the narrow reading of Trinko may well be
correct, concluding that antitrust oversight was inappropriate in the securities law context
because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) possessed authority to police the
relevant conduct, and there was "evidence that the responsible regulatory entities exercise[d]
that authority." 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2392-93 (2007) (noting the SEC's "active and ongoing
exercise of that authority"). To be sure, it is still plausible that a nominal "exercise of
regulatory authority"-such as considering whether there is a problem-could displace
antitrust oversight. But the mere possession of authority does not appear to be sufficient to
do so.
167. Reconsidering Our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and Innovation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (written statement of
Blair Levin, Managing Director, Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc.), available at http://judiciary
.senate.gov/print.testimony.cfm?id = 1937&witjid=542 1.
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hold-up tactics from the broadband providers which may be tempted to
engage in ex post opportunistic behavior.
168
The preservation of a best efforts Internet option means that carriers will
be prevented from "playing favorites" on that network. Consequently, such
a network would not include any degradation of traffic when there is
available bandwidth, or as Edward Felton describes it, a ban on "non-
minimal discrimination." 169 To be sure, even for best efforts connections,
nontargeted policies could still be used to manage network traffic, but such
management rules would not be able to restrict traffic in the absence of
restrained capacity. By so doing, this requirement would constitute a
minimal safeguard of available Internet access without any opportunity for
network providers to discriminate in favor of particular technologies or
applications developers. Notably, this safeguard would protect the upstart
innovator or grassroots form of peer production that, as Scott Hemphill
explains, is the type of producer that would most likely be adversely
affected by exclusionary strategies involving selective QoS offerings.17
0
168. On the importance of enabling entry in the first place, see id. As to the innovation
costs of ex post opportunism, see Greenstein, supra note 143, at 41 (noting the concern that
"the bargaining costs of making deals with carriers after demonstrated success will interfere
with the incentive to innovate in the first place"). On the more broad issue of discouraging
innovation, Shane Greenstein summed up the concern as follows:
Seen through the lens of economic experiments, there are two concerns. First,
a carrier can use pre-innovation contracting to generate market conditions that limit
entry of innovative content providers. Second, carriers can use post-innovation
bargaining to strategically aid their competitive position. There are a variety of
reasons why both of these are a general concern, because the carriers may intend to
imitate content providers, may intend to compete through provision of their own
service, or may intend to compete with alliance with another content provider. And
there are a variety of ways for a carrier to take such action.
Id.
169. Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality, 6 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3, available at
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf).
170. See C. Scott Hemphill, The New Common Carriage: Foreclosure, Extraction, and
Zero-Price Regulation, 26 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 41-44, on
file with author) (addressing value of network neutrality regulation to peer production). The
Center for Democracy & Technology elaborated on this concern:
The history of the Internet has been marked by numerous examples of new
technologies-such as instant messaging or web-based video-that emerge from
humble beginnings but then become extremely popular. The "next big thing"
might never have a chance to develop and become popular if the approval and
cooperation of several top broadband access providers were to become a
prerequisite to widespread use. The pace of innovation that has been the hallmark
of the Internet could slow substantially.
Broadband Industry Practices, Reply Comments of the Center for Democracy & Technology,





The market for broadband Internet access is still evolving and
considerable innovation both in applications and in the network itself will
continue over the coming years. Thus, a thoughtful competition policy and
consumer protection strategy must embrace and facilitate the remarkable
pace of innovation in the Internet sector. As discussed above, the optimal
consumer protection strategy, which should be superintended by the FTC,
seems both reasonably uncontroversial and attainable. The appropriate
competition policy, by contrast, presents a more challenging judgment call.
As explained above, I favor a model that emphasizes after-the-fact
judgments based on a legal standard rather than one that prescribes
particular conduct before the fact. To be sure, I recognize the appeal of a
rule that would prohibit selective access tiering opportunities and require
that all quality assurances be afforded on a reasonable and
nondiscriminatory basis. Such a rule, however, is far from costless because
it would undoubtedly bar some procompetitive arrangements and may well
give rise to some unfortunate unintended consequences.
The essential virtue of an antitrust-like model of regulation is that it
would provide an institutional strategy for scrutinizing the behavior of
broadband providers while allowing them to enter applications markets and
experiment with different business arrangements. In principle, it would
provide an effective mechanism for sanctioning anticompetitive conduct
designed to protect legacy revenues, use inefficient and anti-consumer
price discrimination strategies, or extract "rents" from profitable
applications through strategic behavior. At this point, however, it remains
to be seen whether policymakers will be able to identify and develop a
trusted and effective dispute resolution system-whether through
self-regulation, the FCC, or the FTC. If such a system fails to emerge
because the FCC cannot manage such a model or because antitrust
oversight is unavailable, the case for a categorical rule becomes far more
difficult to oppose.
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